An assessment of support systems to mine isolated blocks of ground at Thuthukani shaft, KDC by Madhopershad, Richard
1 
 
  
 
 
A N   A S S E S S M E N T   O F   S U P P O R T   S Y S T E M S   T O   M I N E    
I S O L A T E D   B L O C K S   O F   G R O U N D   A T   T H U T H U K A N I  
S H A F T ,   K D C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Richard Madhopershad 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A research report submitted to the Faculty of Engineering and the Built Environment, 
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Master of Science in Engineering. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Johannesburg 2013 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
DECLARATION 
 
I declare that this research report is my own, unaided work. It is being submitted for the 
Degree of Master of Science to the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It 
has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other University. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________ 
 
(Signature of candidate) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________ day of November  2013. 
 
3 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
As most of the South African gold mines near their end of life, with regards to the 
original reef horizons and ore bodies planned, a large portion of the gold bearing ore lie 
in isolated blocks of ground which were left behind for various reasons. These blocks of 
ground are now being investigated with the intention of extraction together with other 
low grade ore bodies or reef bands. Although, the cost of gold mining has risen 
substantially, the price received for the finished product has also risen considerably over 
the past decade and it is still one of the most stable forms of long term investment 
(World Gold Council, 2013).  Thuthukani Shaft, KDC has been mining isolated blocks of 
ground over the past decade with improving success.  
 
This research report details investigations into the continuously improving support 
systems that have been used over time with regards to the mining of isolated blocks of 
ground and seismic activity. The investigation reflect an improving work environment 
with regards to health and safety and indicates that the support system used at present 
is capable of preventing damage to workplaces with fairly high seismic activity. 
 
The report contains an analysis of seismic activity with regards to injury and damage to 
workplaces in relation to the improvements made to the support system over time at 
Thuthukani Shaft, KDC. The report also contains detail regarding the improvements 
made to the support system over the past seven years and includes some production 
statistics in relation to seismic activity at Thuthukani Shaft, KDC. 
  
4 
 
 
In memory of all employees 
 that have fallen victim  
to seismic related activity 
 at Thuthukani Shaft, 
 KDC 
  
5 
 
ACKOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
The writer is grateful to Dr Francois Malan, Ninmaalan Naicker, Erkki Makinen and 
Gerard De Wee from the Rock Engineering Department at Kloof Driefontein Complex, 
Paul Kelly from the Safety Department at Kloof Driefontein Complex, Sam Goosen and 
Stephan Walters from the Data Capturing (CPM) and Survey Departments at Kloof 
Driefontein Complex, respectively, John Sloane and Frans Borissza from the production 
teams at Thuthukani Shaft, Kloof Driefontein Complex, for their assistance offered 
during the preparation of this research report. Acknowledgement is given to the 
management of Gold Fields Ltd, Kloof Driefontein Complex and Gold Fields Business 
and Leadership Academy for affording him this opportunity and access to information 
and data to conduct this research.  
 
 
 
 
  
6 
 
 
CONTENTS                            Page 
 
DECLARATION          2 
ABSTRACT           3 
DEDICATION          4 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS         5 
LIST OF FIGURES          9 
LIST OF TABLES          13 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION       14 
1.1 Mine Background        14  
1.2 History         16 
1.3 The Geology of KDC East (Kloof Gold Mine)    18 
1.4 Research Objective         30 
 
CHAPTER 2: PREPARATION FOR MINING OF IBOG AT  
                      THUTHUKANI SHAFT, KDC     33 
2.1 History         33 
2.2 Safety and Production       35 
2.3 Opportunity         36 
2.4 Opening-up and Reclamation      38 
2.5 Conclusion          41 
 
CHAPTER 3: ANALYSIS OF SEISMIC, SAFETY AND PRODUCTION  
DATA RELATING TO SEISMICITY AT THUTHUKANI SHAFT, KDC 42 
 3.1      Introduction         42 
3.2 Seismic Data Analysis       43 
3.2.1 Number of Seismic Events      44 
3.2.2 Number of Seismic Events with Injury and Damage to  
Workings        44 
3.2.3 Number of Seismic Events with No Injury and Damage to  
Workings        47 
3.2.4 Injury Analysis       47 
3.2.5 Damage Analysis       51 
3.2.6 Criteria used for damage ranking     53 
 
3.3 Production Analysis        56 
3.4 Conclusion         62 
 
7 
 
CHAPTER 4: SUPPORT SYSTEMS AND DESIGN IMPROVEMENTS 
OVER TIME        64 
4.1 1999 Panel Support Layout      64 
4.2 2005 Panel Support Layout      65 
4.3 2009 Panel Support Layout      65 
4.4 2011 Managerial Support Instruction     66 
4.5 2012 Managerial Support Instruction     66 
4.6 Area  Coverage Improvements Over the Years    67 
4.6.1 Area Coverage 1999      67 
4.6.2 Area Coverage 2005      68 
4.6.3 Area  Coverage 2009      69 
4.7 Conclusion         71 
 
CHAPTER 5: IMPACT OF PRE-CONDITIONING ON SAFETY  73 
5.1 Introduction         73 
5.2 Why Should We Conduction Pre-conditioning?    74 
5.3 Marking and Drilling        78 
5.4 Charging up and Timing       80 
5.5 Advantages of Pre-conditioning      82 
5.6 Conclusion         85 
 
CHAPTER 6: IN-STOPE NETTING AS ADDITIONAL PROTECTION 87 
6.1 Introduction         87 
6.2 Mine Safety Net Development and Application    88 
6.3 Conclusion         89 
 
CHAPTER 7: IN-STOPE BOLTING AS TEMPORARY AND  
PERMANENT SUPPORT        94 
7.1 Introduction         94 
7.2 How Does Rock Bolting Work?      95 
7.3 Types of Bolts that can be used with In-stope Bolting   99 
7.4 Resin Capsules and Rock Bolt Specifications    102 
7.5  Installation Procedure       105 
7.6 Conclusion         106 
 
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION   108 
8.1 Summary and Conclusion       108 
8.2 Recommendation for Future Work     110 
 
            REFERENCES         113 
8 
 
 
APPENDIX A 1999 PANEL SUPPORT LAYOUT (A.S.P. 3.10)  119 
APPENDIX B 2005 PANEL SUPPORT LAYOUT (A.S.P.2.1.30A)  120 
APPENDIX C 2009 PANEL SUPPORT LAYOUT    121 
APPENDIX D 2011 MANAGERIAL SUPPORT INSTRUCTION  
(M.S.I. 2011/01A)       122 
APPENDIX E 2012 MANAGERIAL SUPPORT INSTRUCTION  
(M.S.I. 2011/01C)       123 
APPENDIX F PRE-CONDITIONING CHECKLIST USE AT  
THUTHUKANI SHAFT, KDC     124 
APPENDIX G PAGE FROM THE PILLAR REGISTER AT 
THUTHUKANI SHAFT, KDC     125 
APPENDIX H  PLAN OF IBOG AT THUTHUKANI SHAFT, KDC            126  
9 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES                 Page 
 
Chapter 1 
 
Figure 1.1.1   Gold Fields International operating mines.   15 
Figure 1.1.2   Basic Structure of Kloof Driefontein Complex (KDC). 16   
Figure 1.2.1              Location of KDC East.      17 
Figure 1.3.1   Unconformable relationship between VCR and  
underlying strata.               19 
Figure 1.3.2   Sub-surface geology.      20 
Figure 1.3.3   No. 2 Kloof Reef.       21 
Figure 1.3.4   Libanon Reef.       22 
Figure 1.3.5   VCR single conglomerate.     23 
Figure 1.3.6   VCR Inter-reef lava.      24 
Figure 1.3.7   VCR Inter-reef lava.      25 
Figure 1.3.8   West Wits Line Generalized Stratigraphy.   26 
Figure 1.3.9   Simplified Structure of the VCR.    27 
Figure 1.3.10  Dip section through Thuthukani and Ikamva Shafts 
 on the 43 Line.       28 
Figure 1.3.11   Different water compartments found in KDC East    
lease area.        29 
Figure 1.4.1  Total Gold forecast for Thuthukani Shaft, KDC.  30 
 
Chapter 2 
 
Figure 2.3.1   The BROKK400.       37 
Figure 2.3.2  The Brokk machine at Thuthukani Shaft, KDC.  37 
Figure 2.4.1   Opening-up reconnaissance visit.    39 
Figure 2.4.2   Typical 100% opening-up scenario.    40 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Figure 3.2.1.1   Number of seismic events with magnitude     
greater than 1.       44 
Figure 3.2.2.1  Number of seismic events with injury and damage  
to workings.        44 
Figure 3.2.2.2  Number of seismic events with injury and damage  
in relation to total number of seismic events with    
magnitude greater than 1.     45 
10 
 
Figure 3.2.2.3  Total number of seismic events with injury and/or  
damage with magnitude greater than 1, as a  
percentage of the total number of seismic events with 
magnitude greater than 1.     46 
Figure 3.2.3.1 Number of seismic events with no injury and damage in 
relation to the total number of seismic events with 
 magnitude greater than 1.     47 
Figure 3.2.4.1  Number of seismic events with magnitude greater than 
1 that resulted in injury.      47 
Figure 3.2.4.2  Percentage of seismic events with injury against total  
number of seismic events.     48 
Figure 3.2.4.3  Number of seismic events with serious injury.  49 
Figure 3.2.4.4  Number of seismic events with lost day injury.  49 
Figure 3.2.4.5  Number of seismic events with treat- and- return injury. 50 
Figure 3.2.4.6  Number of events with injury- insufficient information 50 
Figure 3.2.5.1  Number of seismic events with damage to workings as a  
percentage of the total number of seismic events.  51 
Figure 3.2.5.2  Number of seismic events with no damage  
in relation to the total number of events.   52 
Figure 3.2.5.3  Number of seismic events with no damage as a  
percentage of the total number of events.   52 
Figure 3.2.6.1  Number of events with minimum damage to workings. 54 
Figure 3.2.6.2  Number of events with average damage to workings. 54 
Figure 3.2.6.3  Number of events with major damage to workings.  55 
Figure 3.3.1   Monthly production results for 2005.    56 
Figure 3.3.2  Monthly production results for 2006.    57 
Figure 3.3.3  Monthly production results for 2007.    57 
Figure 3.3.4  Monthly production results for 2008.    58 
Figure 3.3.5   Monthly production results for 2009.    59 
Figure 3.3.6  Monthly production results for 2010.    60 
Figure 3.3.7   Monthly production results for 2011.    60 
Figure 3.3.8  Annual production results from 2005 to 2011.  61 
Figure 3.3.9   Monthly average production per year.    61 
Figure 3.4.1   Ratio of No. of seismic events to annual production 62 
Figure 3.4.2   Number of seismic events with major damage - forecast 63 
 
Chapter 4 
 
Figure 4.6.1.1 Area coverage calculation 1999.    67 
Figure 4.6.2.1  Area coverage calculation 2005.    68 
11 
 
Figure 4.6.3.1  Area coverage calculation 2009.    69 
Figure 4.7.1  Percentage of total seismic events with no damage to 
workings.        71 
 
Chapter 5 
 
Figure 5.2.1   Stress profile before and after Pre-conditioning.  74 
Figure 5.2.2   Face ejection caused by a large event over 1500m away. 75 
Figure 5.2.3  Face Fracture Mapping using ground penetrating radar 
 for a normal face at a depth of 3.5m.    76 
Figure 5.2.4  Face Fracture Mapping using ground penetrating radar  
for a pre-conditioned face at a depth of 3.5m.  76 
Figure 5.2.5   Fracture mapping – Zone of influence.   77 
Figure 5.2.6  Fracture mapping – Zone of influence.   77 
Figure 5.3.1   Marking of Pre-conditioning holes.    78 
Figure 5.3.2   Plan view of the marking and drilling of 
Pre-conditioning holes.      79 
Figure 5.3.3   Section view of drilling of a Pre-conditioning hole.  80 
Figure 5.4.1   Charging up of Pre-conditioning hole.   80 
Figure 5.4.2   Timing of Pre-conditioning holes in relation to the 
 blast holes.        81 
Figure 5.5.1   Number of Strain Bursts from 2005 to 2009 for  
KDC East.        82 
Figure 5.5.2   Panel with no Pre-conditioning conducted.   83 
Figure 5.5.3   Panel with Pre-conditioning conducted.   83 
Figure 5.5.4  Number of face bursts experienced at KDC East from  
2005 to 2009.       84 
Figure 5.6.1   Checking of Pre-conditioning hole at  
Thuthukani Shaft, KDC.      85 
 
Chapter 6 
 
Figure 6.2.1   Safety net test at the Savuka testing facility.   88 
Figure 6.2.2   Typical installation of in-stope netting.   89 
Figure 6.3.1   In-stope netting at Thuthukani Shaft, KDC.   90 
Figure 6.3.2   In-stope netting used on the face at  
Thuthukani Shaft, KDC.      91 
Figure 6.3.3   In-stope netting in action at Thuthukani Shaft, KDC. 92 
 
 
12 
 
Chapter 7 
 
Figure 7.1.1   Typical section of a stope panel.     94 
Figure 7.2.1   Steel Box.        95 
Figure 7.2.2  Broken Rock.       95 
Figure 7.2.3   Bolts and washers.      96 
Figure 7.2.4  Broken rock between the bolts compressed.  97 
Figure 7.2.5  Tightening the bolts.      97 
Figure 7.2.6  The bottom of the steel box showing the beam created. 98 
Figure 7.2.7  A rock prop is placed on top of the beam created   
demonstrating the strength of the beam created.  98 
Figure 7.2.8   How rock bolts work.      99 
Figure 7.3.1   Types of bolts that can be used with in-stope bolting. 100 
Figure 7.4.1   Cross section of a resin capsule.    102 
Figure 7.4.2   Resin between the rock and the rock bolt.   103 
Figure 7.4.3   Rock bolt, resin and surrounding rock mass .  103 
Figure 7.4.4   Hole depth and diameter.     104 
Figure 7.4.5   Important specifications.      104 
Figure 7.5.1   Resin and rock bolt installation procedure.   105 
Figure 7.6.1   Rock consolidation at Thuthukani Shaft, KDC.  107 
Figure 7.6.2  In-stope bolting at Thuthukani Shaft, KDC.    107 
 
  
13 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES          page 
 
Table 1.4.1 Production Plan for C2013      30 
Table 4.6.1    Summary of changes made to the support standard  70 
Table 4.7.1  Cost of increasing support density     71 
Table 4.7.2  Capital spent on timber and elongate support   72 
Table 7.3.1  Characteristics of different types of bolts used with  
 in-stope bolting.        101 
  
14 
 
Chapter 1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
As most of the South African gold mines near their end of life, a large portion of the high 
grade ore bodies are mined out with isolated blocks of ground remaining. Many mines 
are exploring their secondary reef bands which are generally of a lower and often 
inconsistent grade. Many of these secondary reef bands are marginal and cannot be 
mined profitably as the operational cost of mining increases. It also becomes costly to 
mine these isolated blocks of high grade reef as the volumes, in terms of tonnage 
extracted, are very small and cannot justify the development cost. 
 
A combination of mining the secondary reefs, to create volume, together with the 
isolated blocks of high grade reef to boost the grade, in many cases, makes the mining 
business profitable, and extends the life of mine (Singh and Kataka, 2006). In many 
cases the capital cost of establishing the necessary infrastructure are kept to a 
minimum as most of the infrastructure is already established or requires refurbishment. 
 
A large amount of uncertainty exists with regards to the mining of isolated blocks of 
ground relating to seismic activity and decisions will have to be made as to whether  the 
extraction of isolated blocks of ground continue  or whether mines will have to close 
down due to the mining business not being sustainable. 
 
After several years of experience, the development of methods is often reviewed to 
evaluate whether progress has been made and whether mining can continue and is 
economically viable. This research report considers and assesses the improvements 
made to the support standard at Thuthukani Shaft, KDC in relation to the mining of 
isolated blocks of ground and its ability to withstand large magnitude seismic events. 
The term “IBOG” will be used to represent “isolated blocks of ground” in this research 
report.  
 
1.1  Mine background  
 
Located in the Witwatersrand Basin, in the magisterial district of Westonaria, some 60 
km south-west of Johannesburg, Thuthukani Shaft which is one of the Kloof Driefontein 
Complex (KDC) shafts is actually the old Kloof Main Shaft Complex that belonged to 
Kloof Gold Mine, a division of Gold Fields Limited. Figure 1.1.1, below, indicates the 
operating mines of Gold Fields International. 
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Kloof Gold Mine and Driefontein Gold Mine (formerly East and West Driefontein) were 
two separate entities under Gold Fields Limited. In 2010, a strategic move was made to 
consolidate these operations into one unit under the Kloof Driefontein Complex (KDC) 
with five operating Business Units. 
 
 KDC East comprises of the old Kloof Gold Mine Shafts and KDC West comprises of the 
old Driefontein Gold Mine Shafts which are grouped to form Business Units (BU) 1, 2 
and 3. KDC East is made up of Business Unit 4 and 5. 
 
Each Business Unit is responsible for ensuring that it is profitable and sustainable as a 
unit. Figure 1.1.2, below, indicates the basic structure of the Kloof Driefontein Complex. 
The Kloof Driefontein Complex is one of three South African operations within the Gold 
Fields Group, the other two being the South Deep and Beatrix operations. The 
Company is in the process of separating the Beatrix and KDC operations from South 
Deep by creating a new mining company, Sibanye Gold which was listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) in February 2013. 
 
 
Figure 1.1.1 Gold Fields International operating mines. 
 (Source: Gold Fields Limited) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1.2 Basic Structure of Kloof Driefontein Complex (KDC).  
(Source: Gold Fields Limited) 
  
1.2 History 
 
In the 1950‟s interest was focused on the area to the south-east of Libanon Gold mine, 
where the down-dip extensions of the Ventersdorp Contact Reef (VCR) were expected. 
Several boreholes, which intersected high value ore, were drilled and it was decided 
that this area would support another mine. In November 1964, work commenced on 
Kloof‟s main twin-shaft system. 
 
Almost simultaneously, development from the neighbouring sister mine, Libanon, was 
initiated to exploit the Kloof lease area. This operation, together with the completion in 
1967 of Kloof‟s first ventilation shaft, which was adapted temporarily for rock hoisting, 
enabled a considerable amount of reef to be stockpiled on surface. 
 
In January 1968, six months ahead of schedule, the reduction plant came into operation 
with a milling capacity of 51 000 tons per month. The milling rates had then risen to 190 
000 tons per month. Subsequently, downsizing and restructuring of the operations over 
the years have led to Libanon becoming part of Kloof and Kloof becoming part of Kloof 
Driefontein Complex (Internal source, 1986). 
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Thuthukani shaft has been in existence for over forty five years and hosts two sub 
shafts. Most of the high grade VCR has been mined out with isolated blocks of high 
grade ground remaining, together with the shaft pillar. Mining at Thuthukani Shaft 
occurs at a depth ranging from 2000m down to a depth of 3500m. Pillars in the 1 sub-
shaft zone range from 2000m to 2500m in depth, while those in the 2 sub-shaft zone 
range from 2500m to 3500m in depth (Van der Merwe, 2005).  
 
Figure 1.2.1 below indicates the location of KDC East (Kloof Gold Mine) in relation to 
Johannesburg. 
 
 
Figure1.2.1 Location of KDC East. 
(Source: KDC East, Internal Collection) 
  
KDC East 
KDC West 
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1.3 The Geology of KDC East (Kloof Gold Mine)  
 
The West Wits Line, also known as the Carletonville gold field, lies on the northwestern 
edge of the Witwatersrand basin, 35 km west of Johannesburg. Detailed prospecting 
took place in the area during the 1930s, leading to the eventual development of 10 
mines which are amongst the biggest and richest in the entire basin. These include 
Deelkraal, Elandsrand, Doornfontein, Blyvooruitzicht, Western Deep Levels, Driefontein 
Consolidated, which all occur on the west of the Bank fault and Kloof, Libanon and 
Venterspost which occur east of the break. Libanon and Venterspost now fall under the 
umbrella of Kloof. In addition to gold, uranium and pyrite represent important by-
products of the region. The gold field can be divided into two sections along geological 
lines; the section east of the Bank fault represents a natural sedimentological extension 
of the West Rand gold field and comprises of the Kloof mine operations centered 
around the town of Westonaria whereas the western section is sedimentologically 
distinct and lies between the Carletonville and Fochville. It is the western section which 
is more correctly referred to as the Carletonville gold field, whilst the entire region is 
referred to as the West Wits Line (Robb and Robb, 1998). 
 
The Transvaal Sequence and Ventersdorp and Witwatersrand Supergroups are present 
at KDC East. The Central Rand Group prevails upwards to the Elsburg Quartzite 
Formation, before wedging out against the Ventersdorp Conglomerate Formation. 
Jeppestown shales of the West Rand Group are partially exposed in the deepest 
underground development of the mine. 
 
Transvaal Sequence sediments and volcanic comprising the Timeball Hill Formation 
and Hekpoort Andesite Formation cover the entire lease area. The average dip is 15° to 
the south. Outcrops of post Transvaal diabase sills which have intruded into the 
Timeball Hill quartzites and shales are prominent. 
 
Some alluvium is also present. The Venterspost Dyke is found on surface as are 
numerous faults. 
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Figure 1.3.1 Unconformable relationship between VCR and underlying strata. 
(Source: KDC East, Internal Collection) 
 
Witwatersrand Supergroup 
 
The beds of the Central Rand Group dip to the south-east at 35°-40°. They are 
truncated by the VCR, also dipping to the south-east at 30°-35° as indicated in the 
section view, Figure 1.3.1, above, which is not to scale. However, due to the general 
synformal structure of the Central Rand Group in this area, an arc shaped pattern is 
described by the sub-outcrop traces of the Kloof and Libanon Reefs. Figure 1.3.2 
below, indicates a plan of the sub-outcrop of the different reef bands. 
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Figure 1.3.2 Sub-surface geology.  
(Source: KDC East, Internal Collection) 
 
An important secondary reef mined at KDC East is the No. 2 Kloof Reef of the Elsburg 
Quartzite Formation. It forms part of the Kloof Reefs which constitute a zone of 
conglomerates and quartzites which have been subdivided into the No. 1 Kloof Reef, 
towards the base overlain by the No.2 Kloof Reef. There are a number of marker 
horizons which, although not always distinct, aid locating the zone. The Footwall 
marker, a relatively thin grit to small-pebble conglomerate, marks the bottom of the zone 
of Kloof Reef bands. The Footwall marker is overlain by the No. 1 and No. 2 Kloof 
Reefs, respectively. 
 
The No. 2 Kloof Reef, in turn, is overlain by the Hanging wall marker, a band of 
quartzites with scattered pebbles, and with a conglomerate lag at the bottom and top of 
the bed. Above the Hanging wall marker are the scattered pebble and glassy quartzite 
markers with distances of 12 and 17 meters respectively above the No.2 Kloof Reef. 
Figure 1.3.3 is a photograph of the No. 2 Kloof Reef. 
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Figure 1.3.3 No. 2 Kloof Reef.  
(Source: KDC East, Internal Collection) 
 
The Libanon Reef of the Kimberly Conglomerate Formation lies unconformably on the 
Booysens Shale Formation in the mine area. It is a highly variable reef zone up to 1.8 
meters thick, consisting of alternating bands of matrix- and clast-supported 
conglomerates and quartzite‟s. The pebbles are on average medium to large in size (8-
32millimeters diameter) and consist mostly of quartz with lesser chert, quartzite and 
shale. The matrix of the conglomerates is composed mainly of very coarse quartz grains 
and clay-sized material, a large amount of small round carbon grains (fly speck) being 
apparent, with a greater concentration on bedding planes.  
 
Figure 1.3.4 illustrates the Libanon Reef. 
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Figure 1.3.4 Libanon Reef.  
(Source: KDC East, Internal Collection) 
 
Ventersdorp Supergroup 
 
The VCR is conformably overlain by the Ventersdorp Supergroup lava, which in turn is 
unconformably overlain by Transvaal Sequence at the base of which the Black Reef. 
This results in the VCR sub-outcropping against the Black Reef Formation. 
 
Venterspost Conglomerate Formation 
 
The VCR varies in thickness between 0 and 7.5 meters, but on average is usually 1.0 
meter thick. It consists of conglomerates with interlayered shales and quartzites. The 
conglomerate consists primarily of white, milky, and smoky quartz, with occasional 
quartzite, shale, and agate pebbles being present. The matrix is quartzite, sorting is 
poor, and clast sizes range from medium to cobble size (8-256 millimeters diameter). 
 
Due to the variety of types of VCR observed, various subdivisions have been made.  
The Contact Reef type consists of a single pebble layer, or just a contact between the 
hanging wall and footwall rocks. 
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The Single Reef type varies in thickness from 0.1 to 3.0 meters, composed of a single 
clast- or matrix- supported, generally oligomictic conglomerate. A large variation in 
pebble size (30 – 120 millimeters diameter) and degree of sorting is observed. The 
basal contact is sharp and irregular, due to channeling and scouring.  
 
This type of reef is illustrated in Figure 1.3.5. 
 
 
Figure 1.3.5 VCR single conglomerate.  
(Source: KDC East, Internal Collection) 
 
The Black Shale type occurs in one small area west of Thuthukani Shaft, and wedges 
out against the Black Reef. It is characterised by the presence of angular blocks of 
shale and altered lava up to 1 meter in diameter. These occur together with rounded 
clasts of quartz in a quartzitic matrix. The reef can be up to 3 meters in thickness and 
can consist of two or more distinct reef bands, sometimes separated from each other by 
internal quartzite bands. 
 
The Inter-reef Lava type generally consists of a dark matrix, with clast-supported 
conglomerate (bottom band). The internal lava can reach thicknesses of 3-5 meters. 
The upper band is less well developed, comprising of planar bedded quartzite, often 
pyroclastic, and sometimes a thin conglomerate band may be present.  
24 
 
 
This type of reef is illustrated in Figure 1.3.6. 
 
 
Figure 1.3.6 VCR Inter-reef lava.  
(Source: KDC East, Internal Collection) 
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Figure 1.3.7 VCR Inter-reef lava.  
(Source: KDC East, Internal Collection) 
 
The Composite Reef type is characterized by multiple conglomerate bands separated 
by quartzite and shale horizons, reaching a thickness of up to 2 meters. The 
conglomerates are clast-supported and contain poorly sorted pebbles of white quartz. 
The quartzites can be planar bedded, trough cross-bedded or planar cross-bedded.  
 
The Quartzitic Reef type is characterized by the absence of a conglomerate band and 
consists of a quartzite generally planar or trough cross-bedded. It differs vertically in 
colour in that it is dark grey in the upper region and grades into a light grey to buff 
coloured quartzite at the base. At times a thin shale band may occur above or within the 
upper zone. The basal contact is sharp and characterized by a thin brown zone 
resulting from the oxidation of sulphides. A thickness up to 3 meters is possible, and 
gold content is erratic and low (Internal source, 1986). 
 
 
Figure 1.3.8 indicates the West Wits Line generalized stratigraphy. 
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Collection) 
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Structure 
 
Two major tectonic trends are present at KDC East. The first trend corresponds to major 
dykes striking in a North-South direction. These include the Venterspost, the Libanon, 
and the “Running” dykes. The second trend, which is a parallel system of sinistral tear 
faults with associated dyke intrusions, strikes North East- South West. 
 
The most important faulting on the mine are the sinistral tear faults. Due to the strike of 
these faults being oblique to the strike of the VCR, a resultant down-throw to the North 
West exists. In the south-western corner of the mine a highly faulted area is related to 
small scale folding. It exhibits an open fold pattern, the axes striking North West- South 
East, with a gentle plunge to the South East. 
 
There are four ages of dykes on the mine. The first, the Glenharvie dykes, are the 
oldest, and are of doleritic composition. These dykes strike North West – South East, 
exhibiting no displacement. The Running dyke, as well as the Black dyke, are the next 
oldest, and are melanocratic syenites, or shonkinites, no displacement being observed. 
Thirdly, the Libanon and Venterspost dykes, of Pilanesberg age, are composite dykes, 
i.e. the margins of these dykes consist of doleritic material enclosing the leucocratic 
syenitic core. No displacement occurs across these dykes. The youngest dykes, or tear 
fault dykes, intruded along the fault zones, are of doleritic composition, and cut all 
previous dykes. 
 
 
Figure 1.3.9 Simplified Structure of the VCR.  
(Source: KDC East, Internal Collection) 
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Figure 1.3.10 Dip section through Thuthukani and Ikamva Shafts on the 43 Line. 
(Source: KDC East, Internal Collection) 
 
A North West- South East dip section through the mine, in Figure 1.3.10, illustrates 
most of the most important geological features described above.  Kloof No. 1 and 4 
Shafts are now called Thuthukani Shaft and Ikamva Shaft, respectively. 
 
Water and Gas 
 
Problems related to the presence of Malmani dolomite, and its associated solution 
cavities are not present on the surface at KDC East. This can be attributed to the solid 
capping of Pretoria Group rocks on the dolomite in this area, forming a firm “foundation” 
for surface infrastructure, varying between 200 and 800 meters in thickness, indicated in 
Figure 1.3.10. 
 
Underground water is occasionally encountered in development ends and diamond drill 
holes. It is associated with dykes and fault zones. It originates in the dolomite and uses 
DIP SECTION THROUGH THUTHUKANI SHAFT AND IKAMVA SHAFT ON THE 43 LINE 
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the tectonic features to penetrate into the Witwatersrand sediments. However, these 
fissures are cemented so continual pumping is not necessary. 
 
During shaft sinking through the dolomite, cover drilling invariably intersects varying 
amounts of water, but to date, no problem has been encountered that could not be 
solved by cementation. 
 
Occasionally, small quantities of methane are encountered, 95 percent of all 
occurrences being associated with intrusions. The concentration of methane is 
generally below 10 percent and this is diluted and exhausted by the ventilation system 
before development continues. Figure 1.3.11 indicates the different water 
compartments found in the KDC East lease area. 
 
 
Figure 1.3.11 Different water compartments found in KDC East lease area. 
(Source: KDC East, Internal Collection) 
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1.4  Research Objective 
 
It can be noted from the section above that a significant amount of geological features 
and structures exist at KDC East. These geological features and structures have 
significant impact with regards to seismic activity at KDC East. The primary targeted 
reef band, being the VCR, was also described. This reef band has been extensively 
mined over the years, and in the past decade, only isolated blocks of VCR remaining at 
Thuthukani Shaft, KDC have been exploited.  
 
Table 1.4 .1 Production Plan for C2013  
(Source: Thuthukani Shaft, 2013) 
 
 
Production (m²) Gold Broken (Kg) 
Reef Total Monthly Total Monthly 
VCR (IBOG) 30195 2516 3280 273.33 
KL Reef 3777 314 98.22 8.19 
MR 37816 3151 1161 96.75 
Total Thuthukani 71788 5982 4539 378.3 
 
Table 1.4.1 indicates the production plan for Thuthukani Shaft, KDC for calendar year 
2013.  It can be noted that 42% of the total production square meters and 72% of the 
gold required comes from the VCR IBOG. 
 
 
Figure 1.4.1 Total Gold Forecast for Thuthukani Shaft, KDC. 
(Source: Thuthukani Shaft, 2013) 
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Figure 1.4.1 indicates the total gold forecast for Thuthukani Shaft, KDC for the life of 
mine plan. A large quantity of the gold comes from the mining of IBOG and from 2027 
the mining of IBOG will be the only contributor to gold production extending the life of 
mine by five years. 
 
In May 2008, after a fatal shaft accident at the South Deep Gold Mine,  Gold Fields 
Limited Chief Executive Officer, Nick Holland said, “If we cannot mine safely, we won’t 
mine at all”(Oelofse, 2008). Although a huge amount of focus and effort had been 
placed into improving safety at the mines, this statement prompted management at 
Thuthukani Shaft, KDC to place even more effort into improving the working conditions 
at the mine. Although improvement to the  support standards were being investigated 
prior to this public statement, drive and focus created by this statement, led to a number 
of changes to the support standard that took place in the following years. 
 
The intention of this research report is to analyse the seismic, safety and production 
data captured over the past seven years in order to determine if the support system 
employed at Thuthukani Shaft, KDC is capable of withstanding large magnitude seismic 
events and to analyze and assess the changes made to the support system over the 
past seven years that have led to the support system possibly possessing this capability 
when mining IBOG. 
 
This research will add to the current knowledge base regarding the mining of IBOG. It is 
critical that this research be carried out at this point in time for two reasons, firstly, due 
to a lack of large areas with high grade ore bodies; there is a tendency for mines to start 
exploiting IBOG which are under high stresses. Secondly, with the considerably 
increased focus on safety, it is of utmost importance that these IBOG are mined safely. 
This study will help understand how to plan and exploit these IBOG, safely, in order to 
extend the life of mines and thus sustain the mining business and employment, created 
by the existence of the mine, for a longer period. 
 
The industrial application of the outcomes of this study will be a well structured 
document that will assist the various deep level gold mines that are considering the 
mining of IBOG that were left behind for whatever reason. The lessons learned and best 
practice applied will be elaborated on to ensure that IBOG are extracted in the safest 
manner possible. 
 
Chapter One of this research report describes the background, history and geology of 
the mine and one can take note of the complex geological structure of the 
Witwatersrand Basin and the types of reef found at KDC East. This chapter also 
describes the intention of this research report.  
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Chapter Two describes some of the history and work that is required when intending to 
mine IBOG and one is made aware of the quantity of work and the risks that are 
involved prior to the extraction process. 
 
 Chapter Three contains the analysis conducted from seismic, safety and production 
data captured over the past seven years and a major change in the statistics can be 
noted from the year 2008. This is, consequently, also the year that the Chief Executive 
Officer of Gold Fields, Nick Holland, made the public and mind-changing statement “If 
we cannot mine safely, we will not mine at all”. The data analysed refer specifically to 
the mining of isolated blocks of VCR at Thuthukani Shaft, KDC.  
 
Chapter Four describes the support systems employed over the period investigated and 
highlights the changes made. Improvements with regards to area coverage and support 
density are discussed and these improvements relate to the statistics analysed in 
chapter three.  
 
Chapter‟s Five to Seven discuss pre-conditioning, in-stope netting and in-stope bolting 
in detail. These were introduced sequentially, from 2008, to the support standard in an 
effort to improve the performance of the support standard and consequently improve 
safety in underground workings. An immense amount of work has been conducted by 
various people and organisations like The Chamber of Mines, the CSIR, and Safety in 
Mine Research Advisory Committee (SIMRAC) over the years regarding pre-
conditioning, in-stope netting and in-stope bolting. Some of the detail and best practices 
are discussed in these chapters. 
 
Chapter Eight contains a conclusion and recommendation for future work with regards 
to improving the support standard and the mining of IBOG.   
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Chapter 2 
2. PREPARATION FOR MINING OF IBOG AT THUTHUKANI SHAFT, KDC 
 
2.1 History 
 
Thuthukani Shaft, historically, mined a large portion of VCR with limited secondary 
reefs. The secondary reefs available are the Main Reef (MR) and the Kloof Reef (KR) 
ore bodies which can be mined profitably, provided that the remaining isolated blocks of 
VCR are mined, concurrently, to boost the overall plant grade. The mining of these 
IBOG must be carefully planned and executed as these IBOG are highly stressed and 
pose a serious health and safety risk from a seismicity point of view (Klokow, 2006). 
 
IBOG were left behind for various reasons including the following: 
 
 Ventilation 
 
Blocks of ground were initially mined according to the ventilation districts. As 
new blocks of ground were prepared, from a ventilation point of view, mining of 
the new blocks commenced with more and more of the mining crews being 
moved into the new blocks of ground. When there were only a handful of crews 
left in the old block, the block was abandoned and all crews were moved into the 
new block of ground. All equipment was stripped, reclaimed and ventilation flow 
cut off. Abandoning of high grades in the pillars that were left behind did not 
matter as most of the VCR ground comprised of high grade ore, and the focus 
was to keep the metallurgical plant full of ore, so there was a drive to maximize 
volume output from the underground workings. 
 
 Fire 
 
Some blocks of ground were abandoned due to underground fires, when blocks 
of ground were affected by fire breakouts; they were sealed off and the 
production crews were moved to other parts of the mine that had been prepared 
for mining operations. Some of these fires took long periods of time to extinguish 
and the mine management, at that time, did not want to waste time in re-
establishing these panels while there was plenty of good ground to mine. 
 
Firewalls were also planned, in the older days, to separate sections of the mine 
such that in the case of fires only certain sections would be affected, isolating 
the fire and areas affected by it. These firewalls were anything in excess of ten 
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meters in width, on strike. In some cases, measurements in excess of thirty 
meters, in width, on strike, have been noted. 
 
 Falls of Ground (FOG) 
 
Workplaces were also abandoned when there were falls of ground or when 
areas were affected by seismic related damage. Due to high grade ground being 
readily available and the time and cost related to re-establishing of workplaces 
coupled with the fear of going back into a seismically active area, workplaces 
were abandoned. 
 
 Geological Features 
 
Some workplaces were abandoned when they intersected geological features, or 
when nearing a known geological feature. The task of negotiating the feature 
was associated with additional cost and reduced returns due to the loss created 
by the feature. Mining rates were also reduced when negotiating geological 
features, and in a highly incentivized production operation, this was seen 
negatively. The simpler option was to abandon the workplaces nearing 
geological features and move the production crew into newly prepared ground 
where production rates would be maintained. 
 
 Stabilizing Pillars 
 
Strike and dip stabilizing pillars were also planned as part of the mine design 
and regional support system. The strike stabilizing pillars found at Thuthukani 
Shaft, KDC are in excess of thirty meters in thickness and continue for hundreds 
of meters on strike. They contain a huge amount of high grade VCR ore. 
  
These workplaces remained abandoned for long periods of time and are therefore 
highly stressed as mining around these blocks of ground continued transferring the 
majority of stresses onto these remaining blocks of ground. 
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2.2  Safety and Production 
 
The focus on safety has increased significantly over the past few years and seismic 
related injuries are just not acceptable any more. It becomes fundamentally important 
that for mines to remain operational in the future, where IBOG are required to be mined, 
that the extraction of these blocks of ground be executed in the safest manner 
economically possible. 
 
Over the past six years, various interventions with regards to making the extraction of 
IBOG safer have been introduced with varying degrees of success. Some workplaces 
have experienced seismic events in excess of magnitude 1.2 where results of no 
damage have been recorded. 
 
The mining of IBOG is a specialist area and the entire line management involved must 
be highly skilled in the extraction of IBOG. The mining of IBOG is fundamentally 
different from other types of mining as it is support intensive and involves strict planning 
and execution. One of the most important factors with regards to the mining of IBOG 
that make it fundamentally different from other types of mining is that extraction 
processes have to be consistent and regular. The mining faces cannot stand for long 
periods of time as stresses transferred causes the fracturing process and bed 
separation to build up creating unsafe mining conditions. Safety related stoppages, 
where the mine or sections of the mine have been stopped can have a very negative 
impact on the mining of IBOG. One of the special instructions issued after a lengthy 
stoppage period is for additional support units to be installed in between the support 
units that have already been installed to mine standard, closest to the face, before any 
blasting operations continue.  Mine design and sequence of extraction is of the utmost 
importance and adhering to fundamental mining principles and guidelines with regards 
to the Mine Health and Safety Act is critical for success (Mine Health and Safety Act, 
1996). 
 
Auditing of the various processes is labour intensive and involves a large amount of 
paperwork and data capturing. External auditing with regards to mine design and 
sequence of extraction is carried out regularly to ensure that compliance is ensured. 
This audit process is normally carried out by an external rock engineering consulting 
firm. Auditing of working faces takes place more often than the norm as these IBOG are 
planned with the expectation of high grades and frequent auditing is carried out to 
ensure that the plan is met with regards to sampling values, stope width control and 
dilution. Strata control observers are tasked with auditing workplaces to ensure that 
mining dimensions and rates of extraction are maintained within the plan. This will 
include an inspection of the support installation; face advance and lead-and-lag 
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measurements. This information is then compared to the plan and recommendations 
are then made with regards to correcting abnormal occurrences or deviations from the 
plan, which is then fed to line management. 
 
Thuthukani Shaft is highly dependent on the mining of IBOG, as noted in Figure 
1.4.1,which are normally mined at low production volumes and high grades. More than 
forty percent of the total production, in terms of square meters mined, comes from the 
mining of isolated blocks of VCR ground at Thuthukani Shaft, KDC. The entire block of 
ground is planned with the expectation of relatively high grades and if lower than 
expected grades are achieved, a negative effect on the overall business plan can be 
experienced. More than seventy percent of the total gold output, at Thuthukani Shaft, 
KDC, comes from the mining of isolated blocks of VCR ground (APPENDIX H indicates 
the typical IBOG found at Thuthukani shaft, KDC). 
 
Loss of working places due to seismic damage can be costly if sufficient spare working 
panels are not readily available, spare work panels must also match the grade profile of 
the panel lost in order for production plans to be achieved. Time is also required to 
move production crews to new work places and to re-established damaged work places. 
 
2.3  Opportunity 
 
The main objective of all mining systems is safe production which is a term intended to 
include the philosophy that occupational health and safety, and production should not 
be separate issues. Whatever mining method is utilized, it must ensure an acceptable 
quality of life for those working in the industry and an acceptable return on investment 
for those who finance the venture. The concept of safe production unites the sub-
objectives into a common goal (Pickering, 1996). 
 
A wide range of opportunities also exist with regards to the mining of IBOG. The testing 
and implementation of new technology to reduce work time, remove persons from the 
face area where face ejections occur, to reduce the amount of labour required and to 
improve the overall safety conditions of the workplaces  are some of the opportunities. 
Another is the development of specialist working teams, teams that understand the 
dynamics of mining IBOG and can react and respond appropriately to the various 
conditions that exist. There is an opportunity for the development of one‟s experience 
and research in the mining of IBOG with regards to deep level gold mining, and for the 
development of new ideas, new thinking and new ways of doing things in a dynamic 
mining industry. 
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One of the interventions at Thuthukani Shaft was the introduction of the “BROKK” 
machines. These machines were initially developed in Sweden for the cleaning of large 
industry kilns. Due to the high temperatures, experienced in these furnaces, 
the“BROKK” machine was used to do the cleaning, remotely.
 
Figure 2.3.1 The BROKK 400. 
(Source: www.brokk.com) 
 
The machine was then adapted to be used in the underground environment and is 
capable of conducting most of the Opening-up processes, remotely, with the operator 
situated between ten to twenty meters, in a safe area, behind the machine. 
 
 
Figure 2.3.2 The BROKK machine at Thuthukani Shaft, KDC. 
(Source: Personal Collection) 
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Figure 2.3.2 depicts a BROKK machine in an Opening-up environment at Thuthukani 
Shaft, KDC. The BROKK is a trackless system and is capable of conducting work in 
areas where tracks are seriously damaged or worn out. It is also capable of being  
driven over muck piles and work in a retreat manner, barring, loading and moving rubble 
to a more stable area where the rubble is loaded onto a hopper and transported out of 
the workings by locomotive.  
 
2.4  Opening- up and Reclamation 
 
 Opening- up is a process that is followed prior to the accessing of IBOG. It is the 
Opening-up of old haulages and workings in order to gain access to the targeted block 
of ground. Reclamation is the reclaiming of all materials including gold bearing ore 
which have financial value. Old material can be re-used or refurbished for use, and the 
“old gold” that is obtained during the process of opening- up adds value to the gold 
output of the mine, and in many cases caters for the cost of opening-up. The opening- 
up and reclamation process  requires proper  planning which requires investigation and 
research into the history of the workplace is required and the materiality and reliability of 
the information available is often questioned. This is a lengthy process. 
 
Together with the compilation of all the relevant historical information and 
documentation, a reconnaissance of the workplace is required and this requires the 
expertise of highly skilled persons who follow a process of exploring old workings to 
ultimately access the IBOG. During the reconnaissance visit information is captured with 
regards to the physical and environmental conditions, in the form of measurements, 
notes on plans and photographs. Care is taken not to disturb any of the existing 
conditions as this can be an unsafe environment if the necessary care is not taken. The 
team progress to as far as it is physically possible. Sometimes, total closure, excessive 
temperatures and unknown depths of water prevent them from progressing further.  
 
Reconnaissance visits are planned and organized according to a standard. All the 
necessary equipment and material, like plans and first aid kits, are provided and 
checked prior to entering the old workings. The mine manager and control room 
operators are informed of the visit, the industry numbers and details of persons that will 
embark on the visit together with the approximate time of entry and exit into the old 
workings are conveyed to the operations manager and control room operators. The 
control room operators will carefully monitor progress of the reconnaissance visit with 
members of the reconnaissance team making contact with the control room regularly. 
Prolonged loss of contact or a report of injury will prompt the control room to dispatch a 
rescue team or the necessary medical assistance that is required. 
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Figure 2.4.1 Opening-up reconnaissance visit.  
(Source: Personal Collection) 
 
Opening-up is categorized into four groups ranging from 25% opening-up, up to 100% 
opening-up which is total closure of a tunnel or access way. Figure 2.4.1 depicts a 
member of a reconnaissance team inspecting a fall of ground on a reconnaissance visit. 
The reconnaissance visit member is looking at a typically 50% opening-up situation 
leading from a 25% opening-up situation. It is important to understand that once barring 
of the side walls and hanging walls take place, the muck pile being inspected will 
increase in volume. One can also notice the extent of deterioration of the track work and 
the reddish-brown colour of the stagnant water caused by oxidation of the infrastructure. 
 
Figure 2.4.2 depicts a 100% opening-up scenario. Ring-set support and timber cribbing 
that was damaged over time will have to be removed and replaced as part of the 
opening- up procedure. Care musts be exercised in the removal process as one does 
not know the extent of damage that lies behind the damaged support units. Ten linear 
meters per month is typically planned for this type of opening-up and in many cases this 
rate is not achieved. 
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Figure 2.4.2 Typical 100% opening-up scenario.  
(Source: Personal Collection) 
 
The information captured on the reconnaissance visit is then used to plan the Opening-
up of old workings with regards to support and equipping, and a time frame is also 
determined.  The information available is used to assume the conditions of the workings 
that are further than the last point of access. Grab samples taken on the 
reconnaissance visit are used to give an indication of the gold grades expected from the 
targeted block of ground, this is also compared to the historical sampling data in order 
to improve the level of confidence with regards to the value expected from the targeted 
block of ground. 
 
The Opening-up and reclamation process must be able to link into the production 
planning for the mine. If this cannot be done with a certain amount of confidence, the 
entire mining plan is at risk of failure due to the fact that workplaces may not be 
accessed and equipped in time for mining as indicated on the production plan for that 
specific year. It therefore requires special expertise whereby persons are able to make 
good judgments with regards to setting up the Opening-up, equipping and production 
plan for that specific workplace. The process also has to be „project managed‟ with the 
necessary persons being accountable for their input and output. 
 
Further to this, a highly skilled work team is required to actually conduct the Opening-up 
and equipping of these workplaces which are perceived to have relatively unsafe 
Damaged 
steel ring 
set 
Damaged 
timber 
cribbing 
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conditions. The process of Opening-up old workings is a laborious task as the team has 
to be very aware of what is happening to the environment around them as they proceed 
with Opening-up towards the IBOG targeted. A continuous risk assessment with regards 
to safety is conducted which can be time consuming as the environment changes so 
often. The team has to be skilled in identifying change that could affect their health and 
safety and address the issues of concern while at the same time trying to progress with 
their Opening-up process. 
 
2.5  Conclusion 
 
The mining of IBOG requires a large amount of investigative work which is a 
combination of desk top and practical work with regards to planning and execution, as 
noted above. It is of utmost importance that the support system employed is capable of 
protecting the persons that work in these areas during the extraction process. The hard 
work, effort and financial input that go into the planning and execution are wasted if 
persons are injured, and production operations have to cease. Furthermore, the loss of 
production from high grade IBOG jeopardizes the monthly production plan and 
ultimately the business plan of the mine with regards to gold output, placing more 
pressure on other workings to over produce in order to accommodate for the loss. 
 
The following chapter contains an analysis of seismic, safety and production data, which 
was captured over a seven year period, from 2005 to 2011, in order to determine if the 
changes made to the support standard over this period did add value with regards to 
reducing injury and damage to workplaces where seismic events in excess of 
magnitude 1 were experienced. 
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Chapter 3 
3. ANALYSIS OF SEISMIC, SAFETY AND PRODUCTION DATA RELATING TO 
SEISMICITY AT THUTHUKANI SHAFT, KDC 
3.1 Introduction 
 
A seismic event is a transient earth motion caused by a sudden failure of the earth‟s 
crust. The resulting emission and radiation of kinetic energy in the form of ground 
vibrations causes a sensible „shock‟ or tremor. Depending on many factors, this energy 
may or may not result in damage to underground or surface structures. The term is 
applied to events ranging from largest earth quake to the smallest of events which result 
in a barely-detectable tremor close to the source- a range of ten orders of magnitude. 
The magnitude of vibration at the source is commonly described in terms of Richter 
magnitude (Jager and Ryder, 1999). 
 
In the early 1900s it became apparent that blocks of ground left along geological 
structures or as a result of the mining configuration needed to be defined, classified and 
declared as it was found that there was an increase in the number of rockbursts and 
mining problems associated with these blocks of ground. A committee, the 
“Witwatersrand Rockburst Committee”, was appointed in 1924 to report on the 
occurrence of rockbursts and the control thereof. The Witwatersrand Rockburst 
Committee published a report that was presented to Parliament in 1924. In this report a 
rock burst was defined as phenomenon known as “Pressure Burst,” “Air Blast,” “Strain 
Burst,” “Rock Thrust,” “Blistering,” “Spitting,” “Sudden Flaking,” “Bumps,” “Crumps” and 
“Quakes,” all of which referred to the sudden rupturing of rock in situ not caused 
intentionally by tools or explosives. These phenomena would occur in the solid, newly 
opened stopes, stope faces, stope pillars, dykes, sides of a level, drive pillars, working 
shafts, remnants and or faults (Le Roux, 2008). 
 
A rock burst is the sudden and violent disruption of rock or disturbances of excavation 
walls in mines, which is caused by, or accompanied by, a „shock‟ or tremor (seismic 
event) of sufficient magnitude to cause obvious damage to excavations and support, or 
widespread simultaneous falls of rock; a rock burst is a consequence of mining activity 
(Jager and Ryder, 1999). 
 
Bearing the above definitions in mind, data captured by the seismic, safety and survey 
departments with regards to mining of IBOG at Thuthukani Shaft, KDC over the past 
seven years were retrieved and analysed.  Seismic data and injury statistics were 
compared to identify and correlate events, location, injury and damage. The analyses 
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indicate clear trends that were established in relation to the improvements made to the 
support standard. Production data was limited but some important findings were 
determined from the data that was available. It is important to note that damage caused 
to workings with regards to the definition of „rock burst‟ above was the main focus as 
this leads to injury. The last part of the definition states that „a rock burst is a 
consequence of mining activity‟ and this was highlighted from the analysis of the 
production results where periods of higher production resulted in more seismic activity. 
The analyses and trends established are discussed in the following sub-sections. 
 
3.2 Seismic Data Analysis 
 
Seismic data captured for all significant events at Thuthukani Shaft with regards to the 
mining of IBOG in Section 22 was analyzed from 2005 to 2011.   Section 22 consists of 
mining of the Ventersdorp Contact Reef band and a relatively small portion of the Kloof 
Reef band. Seismic data is captured daily and is filled in a weekly report. Data consists 
of capturing the origin of the seismic event by different geophones situated in various 
parts of the mine. These geophones have an error margin of up to thirty meters in 
radius. By using the information captured by three or more geophones, the origin of the 
seismic event can be determined with a fair amount of accuracy. The data consists of 
an X, Y and Z co-ordinate with regards to location of the event. This location will result 
in the name of the workplace where the event originated. The magnitude of the event is 
also captured together with the time of the event. Further to the data captured 
immediately for the weekly report will be the number of persons injured and the damage 
caused to the working places. This information will contain the number of panels 
affected, the face length of the panels and number of square meters and tonnage lost 
due to damage and rehabilitation of the workplaces affected. 
 
Seismic data analysis commenced with firstly identifying all events in excess of 
magnitude 1 as recorded by the seismic system at Thuthukani Shaft over a seven year 
period from the beginning of 2005 to the end of 2011. These events were separated 
from events with magnitude less than 1. A few seismic events that occurred in the Main 
Reef Section were also eliminated as they did not involve the mining of IBOG. The 
analyses of the seismic events are described in the following sub-sections of this report. 
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3.2.1 Number of Seismic Events 
 
 
Figure3.2.1.1 Number of seismic events with magnitude greater than 1.  
(Source: KDC Seismology Department database, 2005-2011) 
 
Figure 3.2.1.1 indicates the number of seismic events per year with magnitude greater 
than 1 for Thuthukani Shaft, Section 22 (section mining isolated blocks of VCR ground). 
There was an increase in the number of events greater than magnitude 1 from 2005 up 
to 2007 with 199 events recorded in 2007. This may be attributed to the increase in 
production of approximately one thousand square meters experienced during this period 
which is discussed further in this report. The following four years clearly indicate a 
downward trend year on year regarding seismic events with magnitude greater than 1 
with the year 2011 producing only 65 events with magnitude greater than 1. This 
represents a reduction of 67% as compared to the number of events in 2007. There is a 
subsequent decrease in production experienced during this period. 
 
3.2.2 Number of Seismic Events with Injury and Damage to Workings 
 
 
Figure 3.2.2.1 Number of seismic events with injury and damage to workings. 
(Source: KDC Seismology Department database, 2005-2011) 
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Figure 3.2.2.1 indicates the number of seismic events with magnitude greater that 1 
which have resulted in either injury or damage to workings, or both injury and damage 
to workings. The trend line, indicated on the graph after the year 2007, shows a distinct 
downward trend for the following four years with only three seismic events in excess of 
magnitude 1 resulting in injury and/or damage to the workings. This is a major 
improvement when comparing these results to the results obtained in 2007. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2.2.2 Number of seismic events with injury and damage in relation to 
total number of seismic events with magnitude greater than 1. 
(Source: KDC Seismology Department database, 2005-2011) 
 
Figure 3.2.2.2 indicates the number of seismic events with magnitude greater than 1 in 
relation to the number of seismic events with magnitude greater than 1 which have 
resulted in injury and damage to the workings. A common downward trend is noted 
where there is a decrease in the total number of events with magnitude greater than 1 
from 2007 and there is also a downward trend from 2007 with regards to events with 
magnitude greater than 1 which have resulted in injury and damage to workings. 
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Figure 3.2.2.3 Total number of seismic events with injury and/or damage with 
magnitude greater than 1, as a percentage of the total number of seismic events 
with magnitude greater than 1. 
(Source: KDC Seismology Department database, 2005-2011) 
 
Figure 3.2.2.3 indicates the number of seismic events with magnitude greater than 1 
which have resulted in either injury or damage to the workings, or both injury and 
damage to the workings, expressed as a percentage of the total number of seismic 
events with magnitude greater than 1 recorded for each year. A distinct downward trend 
can be noticed from 2008 to 2011, with only 4.6% of events in 2011 resulting in injury 
and/or damage to the workings. This figure was over 25% in 2005. This turning point in 
2008 correlates to the statement made by the Chief Executive Officer of Gold Fields 
Limited that if we could not mine safely, we would not mine at all, and the subsequent 
improvement in the performance of the support during this period. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
26.1 
14.2 
20.1 
21.4 
8.5 
6.5 
4.6 
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
%
 
Year 
Percentage of Seismic Events with Damage and/or Injury 
47 
 
3.2.3 Number of Seismic Events with no Injury and Damage to Workings 
 
 
Figure 3.2.3.1 Number of seismic events with no injury and damage in relation to 
the total number of seismic events with magnitude greater than 1. 
 (Source: KDC Seismology Department database, 2005-2011) 
 
Figure 3.2.3.1 indicates the number of seismic events with magnitude greater than 1 in 
relation to the number of seismic events with magnitude greater than 1 which have 
resulted in no injury and damage to the workings. It can be noted that from 2009, a 
large amount of seismic events in excess of magnitude 1 have resulted in no injury and 
damage to the workings. 
 
3.2.4 Injury Analysis 
 
 
Figure 3.2.4.1 Number of seismic events with magnitude greater than 1 that 
resulted in injury.  
(Source: KDC Safety and Seismic Department Database, 2005-2011) 
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Figure 3.2.4.1 indicates the number of seismic events with magnitude greater than 1 
that resulted in injury. There is a definite downward trend noted from 2005 to 2011 with 
no events with magnitude greater than 1 resulting in injuries reported in 2010 and 2011. 
 
This is very encouraging statistics, because there were 77 and 65 events with 
magnitude greater than 1 during 2010 and 2011, respectively which, although, is a 
smaller number of events compared to the previous years, have resulted in no injury to 
persons. 
 
 
Figure 3.2.4.2 Percentage of seismic events with injury against total number of 
seismic events.  
(Source: KDC Safety and Seismic Department Database, 2005-2011) 
 
Figure 3.2.4.2 indicates the number of seismic events with magnitude greater than 1 
that resulted in injury expressed as a percentage of the total number of seismic events 
recorded, with magnitude greater than 1. A downward trend can be noted from 2005 to 
2011 with the period between 2008 and 2011 showing a distinct downward trend.  
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Figure 3.2.4.3 Number of seismic events with serious injury.  
(Source: KDC Safety and Seismic Department Database, 2005-2011) 
 
Figure 3.2.4.3 indicates the number of seismic events with magnitude greater than 1 
which have resulted in serious injury. A downward trend can be noted from 2008 with no 
events with magnitude greater than 1 resulting in serious injury in 2010 and 2011.  
 
 
Figure 3.2.4.4 Number of seismic events with lost day injury. 
 (Source: KDC Safety and Seismic Department Database, 2005-2011) 
 
Figure 3.2.4.4 indicates the number of seismic events with magnitude greater than 1 
that have resulted in lost day injuries, from 2005 to 2011. 
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Figure 3.2.4.5 Number of seismic events with treat -and -return injury.  
(Source: KDC Safety and Seismic Department Database, 2005-2011) 
 
Figure 3.2.4.5 indicates the number of seismic events with magnitude greater than 1 
that have resulted in treat and return injuries, from 2005 to 2011. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2.4.6 Number of seismic events with injury - insufficient information. 
(Source: KDC Safety and Seismic Department Database, 2005-2011) 
 
Figure 3.2.4.6 indicates the number of seismic events with magnitude greater than 1 
where details relating to the event have not been captured properly. 
 
It can be noted, from the injury graphs above, that from 2008 there is a vast 
improvement with regards to injury and the reporting structure. There is a marked 
reduction in the number of events resulting in injury and all information reported to the 
safety department correlates to the information presented by the seismic department. 
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The year 2008 was a turning point for proactively improving the support standard and 
reducing injury and damage to workplaces. If the statistics, which are presented in 
Figure 3.2.4.6, were to be added to those that were analysed earlier, it would just make 
the period from 2005 to 2007 look even worse and show a greater improvement from 
the year 2008 to 2011. It would not affect the implication that an improvement with 
regards to injury and damage to workplaces has been noted during the period 2005 to 
2011at Thuthukani Shaft, KDC. 
 
3.2.5 Damage Analysis 
 
A major improvement occurs from 2008, with 28 events with damage to workings, to 
2009, with only 7 events resulting in damage to workings. The following years maintain 
this low number. 
 
 
Figure 3.2.5.1 Number of seismic events with damage to workings as a 
percentage of the total number of seismic events. 
 (Source: KDC Seismology Department database, 2005-2011) 
 
Figure 3.2.5.1 indicates the number of seismic events, with magnitude greater than 1,  
that have resulted in damage to the workings, expressed as a percentage of the total 
number of seismic events with magnitude greater than 1 recorded for each year. A 
marked improvement can be noted from 2008 to 2011 with only 4.6% of the total 
number of events in 2011 resulting in damage to the workings. This graph indicates a 
distinct turning point in 2008 and a constant downward trend from this point forward. 
 
Figure 3.2.5.2 indicates the number of seismic events with magnitude greater than 1 
which have resulted in no damage to the workings in relation to the total number of 
25.2 
14.2 
20.1 
21.4 
7.4 6.5 
4.6 
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
%
 
Year 
Percentage of Seismic Events with Damage 
52 
 
seismic events with magnitude greater than 1 and Figure 3.2.5.3 indicates the number 
of seismic events with magnitude greater than 1 which have resulted in no damage to 
the workings expressed as a percentage of the total number of seismic events with 
magnitude greater than 1 recorded for each year. 
 
 
Figure 3.2.5.2 Number of seismic events with no damage in relation to total 
number of events.  
(Source: KDC Seismology Department database, 2005-2011) 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2.5.3 Number of seismic events with no damage as a percentage of total 
number of events.  
(Source: KDC Seismology Department database, 2005-2011) 
 
It can be noted that the there is a marked improvement in 2009, 2010 and 2011 with 
regards to working places not being damaged from seismic events with magnitude 
greater than 1 with 2011 recording 95.4 % of seismic events with magnitude greater 
than 1 resulting in no damage to workings. This is almost a 20% improvement, jumping 
from a 78.6% in 2008. 
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3.2.6 Criteria used for damage ranking 
 
The information contained in the weekly seismic reports indicated the square meters 
and tonnage that was lost due to damage caused by seismic activity. This loss accounts 
for the time taken to re-establish the workplace, in which time the blasting operations in 
the panel ceases. This information was used in conjunction with the criteria below to 
determine the number of blasts lost, which is dependent on the length of the panel. The 
number of blasts lost is then used to calculate an approximate number of days lost 
which is the number of days that was required to rehabilitate the workplace and re-
establish the working face. The criteria that were used are as follows: 
 
1. Working places with face lengths from zero meters (0m) to twenty meters (20m) 
were assumed to be blasted thrice a week. 
2. Working places with face lengths greater than twenty meters (20m) were 
assumed to be blasted twice a week. 
3. A face advance per blast was assumed to be one meter (1m) 
4. Square meters lost due to seismic damage, as recorded in the seismic reports, 
were divided by the face length to determine the face advance and the number of 
blasts lost. 
 
 
Damage categorization was calculated as follows: 
 
a. Zero (0) to two(2) days lost   – Minimum Damage 
b. Three (3) to five(5) days lost   – Average Damage 
c. More than five (5) days lost   – Major Damage 
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Figure 3.2.6.1 Number of events with minimum damage to workings. 
 (Source: KDC Seismology Department database, 2005-2011) 
 
Figure 3.2.6.1 indicates the number of seismic events with magnitude greater than 1 
which have resulted in minimum damage to workings. A clear downward trend can be 
noted from 2005 to 2008 and a more or less static situation from 2008 to 2011, although 
the number of events are quite low, between 1 and 3 events resulting in minimum 
damage to workings. 
 
 
Figure 3.2.6.2 Number of events with average damage to workings. 
 (Source: KDC Seismology Department database, 2005-2011) 
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Figure 3.2.6.2 indicates the number of seismic events with magnitude greater than 1 
which have resulted in average damage to workings. A downward trend is also noted in 
this graph with the year 2011 producing no events with average damage to workings. A 
major improvement can be noted from the year 2008. 
 
 
Figure 3.2.6.3 Number of events with serious damage to workings.  
(Source: KDC Seismology Department database, 2005-2011) 
 
Figure 3.2.6.3 indicates the number of seismic events with magnitude greater than 1 
which have resulted in serious damage to workings. A marked improvement can be 
noted in the preceding 3 years with one event with serious damage in 2009 and no 
serious damage in 2010 and 2011. An upward trend in serious damage can be noted 
from 2005 to 2008, with 2008 peaking with 13 events with serious damage to workings. 
2008 was also the turning point and a distinct improvement from that point forward is 
noted. This can be attributed to the major focus and drive that was injected into 
improving the support standard, preventing fall of ground accidents and creating safer 
working environments. 
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3.3 Production Analysis 
 
Monthly production results for Thuthukani shaft was retrieved from 2005 to 2011, 
however, workplace specific results were not retrievable. Monthly total results for 
section 22 (section mining isolated blocks of VCR) were retrieved and analysed as 
follows. 
 
 
Figure 3.3.1 Monthly production results for 2005.  
(Source: KDC, BU5 Survey Department Database) 
 
The monthly average production result for 2005 was approximately 6500 square 
meters. 
 
Production output was hampered in September 2005 due to the halting of blasting 
operations in certain sections of the mine due to unsafe environmental conditions. 
These conditions had to be rectified and audited prior to production operations 
continuing.   
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Figure 3.3.2 Monthly production results for 2006. 
 (Source: KDC, BU5 Survey Department Database) 
 
The monthly average production result for 2006 was approximately 7500 square 
meters. Production output was hampered in July 2006 as a result of two notices for the 
suspension of work operations issued by the Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) 
in the form of a Section 54, for sub-standard work conditions. Conditions had to be first 
rectified, audited and presented to the DME prior to production operations continuing in 
the affected workplaces. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3.3 Monthly production results for 2007.  
(Source: KDC, BU5 Survey Department Database) 
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The monthly average production result for 2007 was approximately 7500 square 
meters. Production was affected negatively in December 2007 due to production being 
halted in order to rectify sub-standard work conditions in certain parts of the mine as 
identified by the inspector of mines from the Department of Mineral Resources.  
 
 
Figure 3.3.4 Monthly production results for 2008.  
(Source: KDC, BU5 Survey Department Database) 
 
The monthly average production result for 2008 was approximately 4500 square 
meters. Production output was hampered in March 2008 due the suspension of work 
operations until environmental conditions were rectified to within legal limits and track 
work brought up to mine standard in certain parts of the mine as identified by the 
inspector of mines from the Department of Mineral Resources(DMR) and recorded on a 
Section 54 document. Production was also affected negatively, in September 2008 due 
to a fall of ground fatal that occurred at Kloof 3 Shaft. A section 54 document was 
issued by the Department of Mineral Resources halting operations until an investigation 
into the fatal accident had been conducted and presented to the DMR. During the 
halting of all blasting operations at the mine, workplaces had to be inspected, all sub-
standard work conditions had to be rectified and audited prior to work commencing. 
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Figure 3.3.5 Monthly production results for 2009.  
(Source: KDC, BU5 Survey Department Database) 
 
 
The monthly average production result for 2009 was approximately 2500 square 
meters. Production output was affected negatively in February 2009 due to a fatal 
accident at Kloof 3 Shaft where a seismic event of magnitude 2.5 occurred. Production 
was halted by the Department of Mineral Resources until investigations and findings 
were conducted and presented to the Department of Mineral Resources.  
 
Production was further halted in March 2009 due to a fatal accident that occurred at 
Thuthukani Shaft where an employee had fallen off the headgear. All shaft operations 
were halted until the investigation into the accident was conducted and presented to the 
Department of Mineral Resources. Although production operations were not stopped, 
material and equipment required for mining operations were not allowed to be 
transported, forcing mining operations to stop. 
 
Production was affected negatively in October 2009 due to the stopping of all tramming 
operations resulting from a tramming related accident that took place at Kloof 8 Shaft. 
Investigations had to be conducted and corrective action implemented to prevent a 
similar type of accident. 
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Figure 3.3.6 Monthly production results for 2010.  
(Source: KDC, BU5 Survey Department Database) 
 
The monthly average production result for 2010 was approximately 2500 square 
meters. Production was affected negatively in March and April 2010 due to shaft repair 
work that was required in March when a collapsed pump column had to be replaced. A 
fall of ground fatal accident at Kloof 4 Shaft and a separate accident at Kloof 7 Shaft 
resulted in operations being halted in April resulting in poor production delivery during 
this month. 
 
 
Figure 3.3.7 Monthly production results for 2011. 
 (Source: KDC, BU5 Survey Department Database) 
 
The monthly average production result for 2011 was approximately 3000 square 
meters. Production was affected negatively in some months due to stoppages initiated 
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by the Department of Mineral Resources for the entire Kloof Driefontein Complex and 
strike action. 
 
 
Figure 3.3.8 Annual production results from 2005 to 2011.  
(Source: KDC, BU5 Survey Department Database) 
 
The Annual production results graph, in Figure 3.3.8 indicates a drastic decrease in 
production from approximately 85 000 square meters, on average, up to 2007 to 
approximately 35 000 square meters up to 2011. This drop in production was attributed 
to the shaft repair work that commenced in 2008 where the working capacity of the shaft 
was reduced to 50%. Access to the workings was gained via a secondary shaft and the 
lengthy travel and transport times led to a reduction in production. Future production is 
planned at approximately 35 000 square meters per annum for the life of mine for 
section 22 and since production levels are not planned to increase, it is expected that 
the total number of seismic events per annum should also not increase. 
 
 
Figure 3.3.9 Monthly average production per year.  
(Source: KDC, BU5 Survey Department Database) 
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Figure 3.3.9 indicates the monthly average production per year and clearly indicates 
the drop in production when the shaft repair program commenced. 
 
3.4  Conclusion  
 
Figure 3.2.1.1 indicates the number of seismic events in excess of magnitude 1 per 
year and when comparing the graph to the graph indicating the monthly average 
production per year, a relationship can be noted between production and number of 
seismic events.  A reduction in production led to a reduction in the number of seismic 
events in excess of magnitude 1. 
 
 
Figure 3.4.1 Ratio of number of seismic events to annual production 
(Source: KDC, BU5 Survey and Seismic Department Database) 
 
Figure 3.4.1 indicates the ration of the number of seismic events in excess of 
magnitude 1 to the annual production results for each year which is multiplied by 1000. 
An increase in the number of events per square meter extracted can be noted from 
2005 up to 2009 after which a consistent decrease can be noted from 2009 to 2011. 
 
Although there was a decrease in the number of seismic events in excess of magnitude 
1 which appear to be related to the apparent decrease in production output over the 
years, large magnitude events did occur. Figure 3.2.5.1 indicates clearly that a 
decreasing percentage of events, annually, resulted in damage to workings, with 2011 
producing 4.6% of events in excess of magnitude 1, resulting in damage to workings. 
So, although the number of seismic events in excess of magnitude 1 had decreased 
over the recent years, the damage caused by these events had also decreased. 
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Figure 3.4.2 indicates the Major Damage Forecast which is the number of events, with 
magnitude greater than 1, which could have resulted in major damage from 2009 to 
2011. This graph was generated by using the average production to number of events 
with major damage ratio from 2005 to 2008, and applying it to the production delivered 
for each year from 2009 to 2011. By applying a minimum factor of five days lost per 
event with major damage, it can be noted that fifteen to twenty days would have been 
lost each year. Assuming a 23 shift production month, this equates to almost losing the 
entire months production. Assuming that an average of twenty kilograms of gold is 
produced from each panel, this equates to approximately twenty kilograms of gold being 
lost each year. Assuming a gold price of R 400 000/kg, this equates to a loss in revenue 
of R 8 000 000.  
 
 
Figure 3.4.2 Number of seismic events with major damage - forecast. 
(Source: KDC, BU5 Survey and Seismic Department Database) 
 
However, post 2008 this trend did not occur, with only one event with major damage 
being recorded in 2009 and no events with major damage being recorded in 2010 and 
2011. 
 
By using the same criteria above and applying it to the 2008 results, we have 13 events 
with major damage. Assuming that 5 days were lost per event, a total of 65 days is lost 
for the year. Assuming a 23 day month, a total of 2.83 months is lost. Assuming a loss 
of 20kg of gold per month, a total of 56.5 kg of gold is lost for the year. Assuming a gold 
price of R 400 000/kg, this equates to a loss of over R 22 million for the year in direct 
revenue. This excludes the cost of labour and material required to re-establish the 
damaged panels and also excludes the cost of injury. 
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Chapter 4 
4. SUPPORT SYSTEMS AND DESIGN IMPROVEMENTS OVER TIME 
 
The purpose of this chapter of the research report is to investigate the support systems 
used in 2005 and how the design of this system has evolved over time to the one that is 
in current use. Improvement of the support system will be noted, sequentially, in an 
effort to improve the safe working conditions in relation to seismic related damage to 
working places. These improvements to the support standards will be discussed in 
relation to the analysis conducted with regards to seismic events in excess of 
magnitude 1 that were experienced at Thuthukani Shaft over the past seven years. 
 
4.1 1999 Panel Support Layout (A.S.P.3.10) (APPENDIX A) 
 
 In 1999 the Stoping and Support Method standard was revised and the support 
layout for panels on composite packs and elongates included the use of pack 
support units and pre-stressed elongate support units with no load spreader 
headboards. 
 
 The elongates spacing on dip was 1.5 m and on strike an alternating sequence of 
1.8 m and 1.3 m was designed, measured skin-to-skin. 
 
 The distance from the face to the last line of elongate support was not to exceed 
2.8 m 
 
 Pack spacing was not to exceed 3 m on dip and 2 m on strike, measured skin-to-
skin. 
 
 The distance from the last line of pack support to the face was not to exceed    
3.6 m before the blast. 
 
 A line of temporary support was to be installed if the elongate to face distance 
exceeded 1.4 m. The dip spacing of these temporary support units was not to 
exceed 1.2 m. 
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4.2 2005 Panel Support Layout (A.S.P.2.1.30A) (APPENDIX B) 
 
 The support standard included the use of pack support units and pre-stressed 
elongate support units with load spreader headboards. 
 
 The elongate spacing was 1.5 m on dip and strike, measured skin -to- skin. 
 
 The distance from the face to the last line of elongate support before the blast 
was not to exceed 2.4 m 
 
 Pack spacing was not to exceed 2.3 m on dip and strike, measured skin- to- skin. 
 
 The distance from the face to the lasts line of packs was not to exceed 4.8 m 
after the blast. 
 
 Where stoping widths exceeded 2.2 m, double packs were to be installed with 
the long axis on dip. 
 
 A line of temporary support was to be installed if the elongate to face distance 
exceeded 1.5 m. The dip spacing of these support units was not to exceed 1.5 m 
and no person was to work further than 1 m from support 
 4.3 2009 Panel Support Layout (APPENDIX C) 
 
 In 2009, the support standard was changed to improve support coverage. In 
working places where only water jetting was used to clean, additional elongates 
with load spreader headboards were to be installed on dip midway between two 
lines of packs. 
 
 In working a place where scraper cleaning was carried out additional elongates 
were to be installed midway between the rows of packs with load spreader 
headboards in the direction of mining. 
 
 Pack support spacing was reduced to 1.9 m on strike and 1.5 m on dip. Umbrella 
packs were introduced and were to be installed at the discretion of the 
responsible line management depending on local ground conditions. 
 
 Elongate spacing was also reduced to 1.5 m on strike and 1.3 m on dip. 
 
 Pre-conditioning was also introduced as a standard on all working panels. 
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4.4 2011 Managerial Support Instruction (M.S.I.2011/01A) (APPENDIX D) 
 
In 2011, the support standard was revised to include in-stope netting. Investigations 
into rock fall accidents concluded that rocks were falling between support units in the 
vicinity of the working face and injuring persons. Furthermore, in seismic related 
accidents, most of the damage and injury was cause by fractured rock falling from the 
hanging in the vicinity of the working faces. This led to the sourcing, further design and 
installation of nets to capture falling rock in the vicinity of the working face which will 
allow for persons to be protected from falling rocks and also allow some time to escape 
from the affected area. 
 
The installation of nets forms part of the standard and is installed by hooking the nets on 
to the elongate support which have fixtures designed for this purpose. The nets are then 
tightened against the hanging wall. Normal work operations are carried out for the shift 
and the nets are removed and stored in a safe place at the end of the shift. 
 
Nets are inspected for damage and are replaced when damaged or when the 
prescribed period for use is exceeded. 
 
4.5 2012 Managerial Support Instruction (MSI 2011/01C) (APPENDIX E) 
 
In 2012, in-stope bolting was added to the support standard. This addition involves the 
drilling and installation of tendons into the hanging wall together with a resin injection to 
help consolidate the hanging wall. Tendons must be installed after every blast at a dip 
spacing not exceeding 1.5 m and not more than 0.5 m from the advancing face, on 
strike for breast mining, and an alternate configuration would be employed for up-dips 
and wide raises.   
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 4.6 Area Coverage Improvement over the years 
 
4.6.1. Area Coverage1999 (Not to scale)                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6.1.1 Area coverage calculation 1999. 
 (Source: personal calculation from support standard 1999) 
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3.1 m x 4.1 m = 12.71 m2 
 
For a 20m x 20m panel: 
400 m2 / 12.71 m2 = 32 packs 
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Elongate Support 
 
Area covered by a set of elongates: 
3.1 m x 1.5 = 4.65 m2 
Area covered by a single elongate: 
4.65 m / 2 = 2.325 m2 
 
For a 20m x 20m panel: 
400 m2 / 2.325 m2 = 172 packs 
An area of 20 m on strike and 20 m on dip required 32 composite packs and 
172 elongates to comply with the support standard in 1999. 
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4.6.2. Area Coverage 2005 (Not to scale)  
                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6.2.1 Area coverage calculation 2005 
(Source: personal calculation from support standard 2005) 
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For a 20 m x 20 m panel: 
400 m2 / 11.56 m2 = 35 packs 
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Elongate Support 
 
Area covered by a single elongate: 
1.5 m x 1.5 m = 2.25 m2 
 
For a 20m x 20m panel: 
400 m2 / 2.25 m2 = 178 elongates 
An area of 20 m on strike and 20 m on dip required 35 composite packs and 
178 elongates to comply with the support standard in 2005. 
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4.6.3. Area Coverage 2009 (Not to scale)                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6.3.1 Area coverage calculation 2009. 
 
Figure 4.6.3.1 Area coverage calculation 2009 
(Source: personal calculation from support standard 2009) 
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Area covered by a single pack: 
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For a 20m x 20m panel: 
400 m2 / 7.2 m2 = 56 packs 
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Elongate Support 
 
Area covered by a single elongate: 
1.5 m x 1.3 m = 1.95 m2 
 
For a 20m x 20m panel: 
400 m2 / 1.95 m2 = 205 elongates 
An area of 20 m on strike and 20 m on dip required 56 composite packs and 
205 elongates to comply with the support standard in 2009. 
70 
 
The simple calculations above indicate how support density has improved over the 
years with regards to pack and elongate support. This improvement was prompted by 
the fact that workplaces were still experiencing gravity and seismic related rock fall 
damage. An area of 400 m2 required 32 timber packs in 1999, whilst in 2009; this area 
required 56 timber packs. The area coverage and support density has drastically 
improved over this period. 
 
These improvements, although increasing mining costs, have added value with regards 
to preventing damage to workplaces and ensuring the health and safety of persons 
employed in these workings.  
 
Furthermore, the introduction of pre-conditioning, in-stope netting and the latest 
introduction of in-stope bolting have all added immense value with regards to 
improving the health and safety conditions of the working environment. 
 
Table 4.6.1 Summary of changes made to the support standard.  
(Source: personal compilation, 1999-2012) 
 
SUPPORT CHANGE 
  Pack Support Elongate Support Additional 
YEAR 
Pack 
Spacing 
(dip x strike) 
Area 
supported 
by unit (m2) 
Elongate 
Spacing  
(dip x strike) 
Area 
supported 
by unit(m2)   
1999 3.0 m x 2.0 m  12.71 1.0 m x 1.5 m 2.33   
2005 2.3 m x 2.3 m  11.56 1.5 m x 1.5 m  2.25   
2009 1.5 m x 1.9 m  7.2 1.3 m x 1.5 m  1.95 
Pre-conditioning and 
additional elongates 
2011 1.5 m x 1.9 m  7.2 1.3 m x 1.5 m  1.95 In-stope netting 
2012 1.5 m x 1.9 m  7.2 1.3 m x 1.5 m  1.95 In-stope bolting 
 
 
Table 4.6.1 indicates the changes made to the support standard from 1999 to 2012. It 
can be noted that there is an increase in support density from 1999 to 2009 from a 
resultant decrease in area supported per support unit. From 2009 the area supported by 
pack and elongate support has remained constant; however, pre-conditioning was 
introduced as a standard followed by in-stope netting in 2011 and lastly, in-stope bolting 
in 2012. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
 
 
Figure 4.7.1 Percentage of total seismic events with no damage to workings. 
(Source: KDC Seismology Department database, 2005-2011) 
 
Figure 4.7.1 indicates the percentage of total number of seismic events with magnitude 
greater than 1 which have resulted in no damage to the workings from 2005 to 2011. A 
general improvement can be noted from 2005 to 2011. A significant improvement can 
be noted from 2009 to 2011. This improvement is, consequently, in line with the 
improvements made to the support standard from 2009 whereby the support density 
was significantly increased and the introduction of pre-conditioning and in-stope netting 
as a standard on all working panels. 
 
By using the latest cost per timber unit of R 23.08 and R 801.50 per rock prop, a cost 
comparison between the different support upgrades was calculated.  
 
Table 4.7.1 Cost of increasing support density. 
(Source: personal compilation, 2013) 
 
Year 
No.  
Packs 
No. 
Elongates 
Cost of 
Packs 
(Rands) 
Cost of 
Elongates 
(Rands) 
Total 
Cost 
(Rands) 
Cost/m2 
(Rands) 
% 
Increase 
1999 32 172 33235.2 137858 171093.2 427.73 0 
2005 35 178 36351 142667 179018 447.55 4.6 
2009 56 205 58161.6 164307.5 222469.1 556.17 24.3 
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Table 4.7.1 shows the cost of increasing support density using the support 
requirements as per standard for an area of 400m2, 20 m on strike and 20 m on dip. 
The cost per square meter is also shown together with the increase in percentage cost 
from one standard to the next. There was a 24.3% increase in support costs from the 
2005 support standard to the 2009 support standard. This information was applied to 
the production results for each year, as shown in Table 4.7.2, indicating the total 
amount of capital spent on timber and elongate support. 
 
Table 4.7.2 Capital spent on timber and elongate support. 
(Source: personal compilation, 2013) 
 
Year Square meters mined  (M2) Cost (Rands) 
2005 79553 35 603 547 
2006 93367 41 785 934 
2007 92698 41 486 526 
2008 52464 23 480 001 
2009 32378 18 007 761 
2010 33211 18 471 053 
2011 35037 19 486 625 
 
Table 4.7.2 indicates the capital spent on timber and elongate support for each year 
from 2005 to 2011. It can be noted that although the cost per square meter increased by 
over 24% in 2009, the total capital cost decreased from 2008 due to the decrease in 
production output. 
 
If one considers the year 2008, just over R 23 million was spent on total support costs. 
The previous rough calculation, in chapter 3, indicated a loss of revenue of over            
R 22 million in gold production, excluding the cost of re-establishing workplaces and 
injury for the same year. Although there is an increase in support cost of 24.3% from the 
2005 support standard to the 2009 support standard, there is a definite financial gain 
with regards to not losing production and, more importantly, a safety gain with regards 
to reducing injury and fatalities. 
  
Pre-conditioning has made a significant contribution towards creating safer mining 
environments at Thuthukani Shaft, KDC. The following chapter discusses pre-
conditioning in detail, how it works and the benefits of conducting pre-conditioning 
correctly. 
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Chapter 5 
5. IMPACT OF PRE-CONDITIONING ON SAFETY 
 
 5.1 Introduction 
 
Pre-conditioning was known as a de-stressing blast and was introduced at East Rand 
Proprietary Mines (ERPM) with positive results and a reduction in rock bursts (Roux et 
al, 1957).  Despite these results Pre-conditioning was not generally accepted in 
industry. Experimental work was conducted by the Chamber of Mines from 1987 to 
2003 with the results published as SIMRAC Project Reports: 
 
- GAP 030 - January 1996 
- GAP 336 - January 1998 
- GAP 811 - April 2003  
 
This work gave an understanding of the Pre-conditioning mechanism and application 
methodology. The published outcomes included detailed implementation guidelines. 
Face perpendicular Pre-conditioning techniques were tested and it was documented 
and proven that in deep mines substantial benefits could be obtained by using face 
perpendicular Pre-conditioning and this technique is used at Thuthukani Shaft, KDC. 
 
Thuthukani Shaft KDC has also committed to industry best practices and pre-
conditioning is considered as industry best practice to reduce the effects of strain 
bursting and face ejection damage caused by seismic events. Pre-conditioning, when 
executed correctly, improves ground conditions thereby creating a safer mining 
environment. 
 
Pre-conditioning had been used at Thuthukani Shaft in the past. However, it was not 
part of the general support standard and was recommended by the Rock engineering 
department during planning sessions with regards to specific workplaces where face 
bursting was foreseen as a hazard. In 2009, Pre-conditioning was introduced into the 
mining standard for all working panels at Thuthukani Shaft, KDC. 
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5.2 Why should we conduct pre-conditioning? 
 
 
Figure 5.2.1 Stress profile before and after Pre-conditioning. 
 (Source: GAP 336, 1998)  
 
Pre-conditioning is a process used to remobilize existing fractures ahead of the face 
and possibly create new fractures by blasting longer holes, as explained in sections 5.3 
and 5.4 of this report (Mahne, 2004). The strong bonds between fracture planes ahead 
of the face are weakened or destroyed, therefore, strain energy cannot build up directly 
ahead of the working face, and it will build up further ahead of the working face. A 
cushion of stress relieved rock exists ahead of the face. The „broken rock‟ ahead of the 
face acts as a buffer between the stressed rock and the work force. This cushion is able 
to absorb the energy from large events further away and also reduces, or eliminates, 
the effects of strain bursting. 
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Figure 5.2.2 Face ejection caused by a large event over 1500m away. 
(Source: Durrheim, 1996) 
 
Figure 5.2.2 indicates face ejection of rock caused by a seismic event which was 
located 1.5 km away from the working place depicted in the picture. This is an indication 
of the fact that if a mining face is highly stressed, a seismic event which is located some 
distance away can still trigger face ejection of rock. One can notice that the pack 
support is fairly close to the face; however, this has no effect in preventing the face 
ejection. Pre-conditioning of the face would have, most likely, prevented this face 
ejection. 
 
The mechanism of Pre-conditioning is local, that is it affects the area directly ahead of 
the face and it is temporary, that is it is effective for one blast only. The zone influenced 
around the Pre-conditioning hole has a radius of approximately 1.5m as indicated in 
Figures 5.2.3 and 5.2.4. 
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76 
 
 
Figure 5.2.3 Face fracture mapping using ground penetrating radar for a normal 
face at a depth of 3.5m.  
(Source: GAP 336, 1998)  
 
 
Figure 5.2.4 Face fracture mapping using ground penetrating radar for a pre- 
conditioned face at a depth of 3.5m.  
(Source: GAP 336, 1998)  
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Figure 5.2.5 Fracture mapping – Zone of influence. 
(Source: GAP 336, 1998)  
 
Figure 5.2.5 above, indicates the fracture mapping, enclosed by the broken white lines 
and one can notice that if the blasted Pre-conditioning holes are spaced more than 6m 
apart  there is almost no overlap in fracturing and the Pre-conditioning holes that were 
not blasted, indicated in yellow, results in stress concentration on the face.  
 
 
Figure 5.2.6 Fracture mapping – Zone of influence. 
(Source: GAP 336, 1998)  
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Figure 5.2.6 depicts pre-conditioning holes that are blasted at closer spacing indicated 
by the solid white lines. The area enclosed by the broken white lines indicates the 
fracture zone and one can notice the overlap of the fracture zone when Pre-conditioning 
holes, indicated by the yellow lines in Figure 5.2.5 , are blasted, resulting in reduced 
stress concentration on the face. 
 
The process of Pre-conditioning involves the drilling of blast -holes at a determined 
spacing on the face which are, a determined length, longer than the normal blast -hole 
length. At the beginning and end of the panel, these holes are drilled at a 30° angle into 
the sidewalls.  
  
These holes are then charged up with explosives and blasted together with the normal 
blast- holes, resulting in a zone of rock ahead of the face where the fractures are 
remobilized due to the blast energy emitted from these charged up Pre-conditioning 
holes. 
 
 
5.3 Marking and Drilling 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3.1 Marking of Pre-conditioning holes.  
(Source: Gold Fields, 2008) 
 
Figure 5.3.1 indicates the marking of Pre-conditioning holes, 3m apart (in green) and 
blast holes (in red). The marking of Pre-conditioning holes in the correct positions is 
vitally important as studies have shown that incorrect marking can lead to adverse 
effects with regards to stress distribution and stress build up on the face. The zone of 
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influence around a Pre-conditioning hole extends to a radius of 1.5m and a spacing of 
3m between any two consecutive holes is ideal.  
STRIKE GULLY
PRECONDITIONING
          CYCLE
DAY 1
DAY 2
DAY 3
DAY 4
Figure 5.3.2 Plan view of the marking and drilling of Pre-conditioning holes. 
(Source: GAP 336, 1998)  
 
Figure 5.3.2 indicates the drilling cycle of the Pre-conditioning holes. Holes are drilled 
15 cm away from the previous blasted hole in a 4 day cycle. This ensures that 
compliance to mining law with regards to the drilling of shot holes next to sockets is 
upheld and that consistency with regards to the spacing of pre-conditioning holes is 
maintained. The four day cycle also ensures that the vestiges of the Pre-conditioning 
hole drilled on the first day are totally eliminated by the third day. 
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Figure 5.3.3 Section view of drilling of a Pre-conditioning hole.  
(Source: GAP 811, 2003)  
 
Pre-conditioning holes are drilled in the middle of the face and must be twice the length 
of a normal blast hole (Mahne, 2004). 
 
5.4 Charging up and Timing 
 
 
Figure 5.4.1 Charging up of Pre-conditioning hole.  
(Source: GAP 811, 2003)  
 
Hanging wall
Footwall
Panel
face
In middle of face up to 2m SW
Preconditioning hole
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Figure 5.4.1 indicates the charging up of the Pre-conditioning hole. The hole is charged 
up with explosives, a top primer and tamping whereas the production hole is charged up 
with a bottom primer, explosives and tamping. This ensures that the primers in both the 
production hole and Pre-conditioning hole are more or less the same depth in the hole, 
this is important as it makes the retrieval of explosives in the case of a misfire more 
manageable. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4.2 Timing of Pre-conditioning holes in relation to the blast holes. 
 (Source: Gold Fields, 2008) 
 
Figure 5.4.2 is an illustration of the timing of Pre-conditioning holes in relation to the 
blast holes. The Pre-conditioning holes are represented by the blue solid lines while the 
blast holes are represented by the red broken lines. Pre-conditioning holes should be 
timed in such a way that the Pre-conditioning holes are blasted ahead of the blast holes. 
The recommendation is that it should be 1m ahead of the blast holes as the purpose of 
the Pre-conditioning hole is not to blast the face but to mobilize existing fractures. 
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 5.5 Advantages of Pre-conditioning 
 
A decrease in the localized damage caused by strain burst has been noticed as 
indicated in Figure 5.5.1. A marked improvement can be noted in 2008 and 2009 when 
Pre-conditioning was introduced into the support standard for the mine. 
 
                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5.1 Number of Strain Bursts from 2005 to 2009 for KDC East.  
(Source: Gold Fields, 2010) 
 
Improved hanging wall conditions, face advance and fragmentation have been noticed. 
Figure 5.5.2 and 5.5.3 indicate panels without Pre-conditioning and with Pre-
conditioning respectively. A significant difference in the hanging wall, face and 
fragmentation condition can be noticed.  
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Figure 5.5.2 Panel with no Pre-conditioning conducted. 
(Source: Toper, 2003) 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5.3 Panel with Pre-conditioning conducted. 
(Source: Toper, 2003) 
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It is vitally important to ensure the correct application of Pre-conditioning as failure to 
apply the correct method could result in undesired effects to the extent of worsening the 
situation rather than alleviating face bursts (GAP 811, 2003). Isolated or incorrectly 
positioned Pre-conditioning holes can transfer stress to adjacent areas and mining 
panels and if positioned too far ahead of the face, they can transfer stress back towards 
the face (GAP 030, 1996). 
 
Pre-conditioning is effective only in a small zone, less than 4m into a mining face. As 
confining stresses increase further into the rock mass ahead of the face the strength of 
the rock mass increases, thus the potential for fracture generation is limited (GAP 030, 
1996). 
 
Figure 5.5.3 indicates much better hanging wall conditions as compared to Figure 
5.5.2. This improvement of the hanging wall conditions caused by implementing pre-
conditioning of the face and side walls helps in maintaining  a consistent and more solid 
beam of rock in the hanging wall.  This results in more stable hanging wall conditions 
which are more robust when a seismic event occurs. The hanging wall in Figure 5.5.2 is 
more prone to a shake down and localized falls of ground due to its blocky and fractured 
nature.  
 
Prior to Pre-conditioning being introduced as a widely used standard in 2009 at KDC 
East, it was normally recommended by the rock engineering department as part of 
special instructions issued when considering or planning the mining of remnant areas. 
After receiving instructions for the wide application of Pre-conditioning in 2008 and the 
formal introduction of Pre-conditioning to the mining standard in 2009, at KDC East, a 
significant drop in the number of face bursts was noticed and is depicted in Figure 
5.5.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5.4 Number of face bursts experienced at KDC East from 2005 to 2009. 
(Source: Gold Fields, 2010) 
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5.6 Conclusion 
 
Pre-conditioning increases the cost of mining as more explosives and accessories, 
longer drilling steel and time to complete the Pre-conditioning work is required which 
could also result in an increase in labour requirements. However, the benefits of pre-
conditioning, which are noted above, are multiple if one has to consider the cost of 
rehabilitation of damaged workplaces, and more importantly the cost of injury and 
fatalities. Pre-conditioning improves the safety conditions of the underground workplace 
which is a fundamental requirement by law in that the mine is required to ensure that 
the health and safety conditions in underground workings are conducive for human 
employment. 
 
Pre-conditioning requires skills to be developed with regards to the process as incorrect 
installation of Pre-conditioning holes can have an adverse effect on the work 
environment. It is therefore fundamentally important that an understanding of pre-
conditioning is developed and communicated to the workforce to emphasize the positive 
effects when conducted correctly and the negative effects when conducted incorrectly. 
 
Regular audits conducted by rock engineering personnel at Thuthukani Shaft, KDC 
include the inspection of Pre-conditioning holes, coaching and training of the workforce 
and disciplinary action taken against supervision if standard processes are not being 
adhered to. Appendix F indicates a typical Pre-conditioning audit check list. The careful 
inspection of Pre-conditioning holes include the inspection of holes drilled on the day of 
the audit and also an inspection of the sockets of the previously drilled Pre-conditioning 
holes to ensure that Pre-conditioning is being conducted with each blast and according 
to standard. 
 
 
Figure 5.6.1 Checking of a Pre-conditioning hole at Thuthukani Shaft, KDC.  
(Source: Personal Collection) 
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Figure 5.6.1 shows two pictures where a pinch bar is used to check the depth of the 
remaining socket of a previously blasted Pre-conditioning hole, after it had been cleared 
of all remaining explosives and washed out. 
 
In many cases where face bursting had occurred after the implementation of the 
standard for Pre-conditioning, it was found, upon investigation that the standard process 
for Pre-conditioning had not been adhered to and a program for re-training of the 
production crew then had to be followed. 
 
 In some areas where the hanging wall conditions were extremely poor, localized falls of 
ground continued to occur. These falls of ground occurred in areas where the hanging 
wall lava was extremely weak. This lava is known as the Westonaria Formation (WAF) 
and tends to rapidly deteriorate when exposed to air and water. Means to arrest these 
falling rocks and prevent injury had to be sought and this led to the exploration of in-
stope netting. The following chapter discusses in-stope netting which was considered as 
best practice and was introduced to the support standard for the entire mine. 
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Chapter 6 
6. IN-STOPE NETTING AS ADDITIONAL PROTECTION 
6.1 Introduction  
 
In 2009, falls of ground were still being recorded even in areas where the standard 
support requirements and density had been exceeded. Localized falls of ground were 
noted in the area closest to the advancing face, between support units. A commitment 
was made to increase the areal support density at the stoping faces. Two techniques 
were readily available. The one was to install in-stope nets which would essentially 
provide additional protection to the day-shift drilling and charging crews, performing 
these operations. The second technique was the installation of roof bolts in the hanging 
wall. This installation has the advantage that the unsupported span after the blast can 
be reduced to less than 1.5m without interfering with cleaning operations. 
 
There are a variety of geo-nets, geo-grids and geo-mesh available on the market. The 
stiffer geo-mesh has proved not be suitable for rockburst conditions. It also tends to be 
unmanageable in the stoping environment. Recently, a galvanized wire rope mesh had 
become available on the market. These nets had not been tested for rockburst 
conditions. Underground tests indicated that the rope tended to unravel and injuries to 
eyes and hands were seen as hazards. They were also seen to be heavy and not easily 
manageable in the underground workings. 
 
Geo-nets were developed specifically to overcome the disadvantages of the geo-mesh 
and geo-grids. Energy is transferred from the rock impacting on the net panel to the net 
perimeter and from there onto the attachment points. Diagonal reinforcement ropes 
transfer load directly to the net attachment points, they strengthen the net substantially. 
Geo-nets have the potential to reduce and eliminate rockfall incidents in stopes and 
tunnels. The choices of safety nets, as well as their specific installation procedures, are 
dependent on site specific requirements. 
 
In 2011, in-stope netting was introduced into the support standard for all panels at 
Thuthukani Shaft with the intention of increasing areal support and reducing rock fall 
injuries. 
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 6.2 Mine Safety Net Development and Application 
 
Generally, mine safety nets are used to protect persons from falling rock in temporarily 
supported development ends, tunnels, advance strike gullies and stopes. These diverse 
applications require specific net designs, resulting in a wide product range. As a rule, 
however, mine safety nets need to carry specified static or dynamic loads with the least 
possible deformation. Because of the application-specific characteristics of mine safety 
nets, there is no South African national standard for them. Consequently, neither the 
South African Bureau of Standards (SABS), nor the CSIR, performs standard tests on 
these components. In 2007, the Safety in Mine Research Advisory Committee 
(SIMRAC) made available their Savuka facility for the testing of mine safety nets. The 
Savuka drop test became the accepted industry test standard for mine safety nets. 
From 2007 to mid-2009, Norsenet, in collaboration with SRK Consulting, the designated 
operators of the site conducted approximately 200 tests, which formed the core of 
Norsenet‟s database of safety net performance under various loading conditions 
(Skarbovig et al, 2010). 
 
Some research into “Mine safety net development and applications” was conducted by 
Skarbovig et al, (2010) and presented at the South African Institute for Mining and 
Metallurgy Conference, Second Hardrock Safe-Safety Conference, 2010. Some of the 
information presented is indicated below.  
 
 
Figure 6.2.1 Safety net test at the Savuka testing facility. 
(Source: Skarbovig, 2010) 
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In-stope netting is widely used in the gold and platinum industry nowadays. Figure 6.2.1 
above, indicates a safety net test at Savuka, showing the 450 kg twin drop mass 
arrested by the safety net. The diagonal and perimeter net reinforcement ropes 
attached to the Camlok prop hooks can be noted. Figure 6.2.2 indicates a typical 
installation of in-stope netting. 
 
 
Figure 6.2.2 Typical installation of in-stope netting. 
(Source: Skarbovig, 2010) 
 
 6.3 Conclusion 
 
In-stope netting has added immense value with regards to improving the support 
system used at KDC from its introduction in 2011. Its practical functionality of arresting 
falling rocks which are either gravity or seismic related does not only improve safety 
statistics, but also gives the working crews a sense of added safety. People have a 
sense of added safety when entering a stope face where in-stope netting has been 
installed.  
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Figure 6.3.1 In-stope netting at Thuthukani Shaft, KDC. 
(Source: Personal Collection) 
 
In practical examples where large amounts of rocks have been ejected from the 
hanging wall, it gave the workforce “a bit of time” to escape. Figure 6.3.1 indicates the 
installation of in-stope netting in one of the stopes at Thuthukani Shaft, KDC. The nets 
are installed between the last line of packs and the face. Additional nets are installed on 
the face to arrest the ejection of rock from the face in the event of a face burst. Blast 
holes are drilled through the apertures in the net. 
 
Figure 6.3.2 indicates an incident at Thuthukani Shaft, KDC, where in-stope netting 
installed on the face arrested the rock ejected from the face in a face burst event. If the 
in-stope netting was not installed on the face, the ejected rock would have been ejected 
into the back areas and possibly injured persons working there.  The installation of in-
stope netting on the face is not standard practice; it is carried out as an additional safety 
precaution and is becoming a more common practice when mining isolated blocks of 
ground at Thuthukani Shaft, KDC. 
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Figure 6.3.2 In-stope netting used on the face at Thuthukani Shaft, KDC. 
(Source: Personal Collection) 
 
In-stope netting, as a standard, was designed in order to protect persons from fall of 
grounds from the hanging wall. However, in-stope netting is only effective if installed 
properly. Ineffective installation will allow too much of sag rendering the net ineffective 
and may cause an obstruction when recovering trapped persons. It is also critically 
important that the nets are attached to secure support units, as support units that are 
unstable will also render the net ineffective  as it will not be able to arrest falling rocks 
with minimum deformation to the net and/or prevent injury to persons. 
 
 
Figure 6.3.3 depicts a production supervisor inspecting the arresting of a fall of ground 
by the in-stope netting at Thuthukani Shaft, KDC. It is clear that the rock arrested by the 
net would have caused serious injury to persons that were working underneath the net 
had the net not been installed. 
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Figure 6.3.3 In-stope netting in action at Thuthukani Shaft, KDC. 
(Source: Personal Collection) 
 
There are a wide range of applications of safety nets with different performance criteria. 
It is important for the rock engineer of a specific mine to ensure that the correct 
specifications of nets are used in conjunction with the support design planned for a 
specific workplace to ensure that the nets being used are capable of arresting falling 
rocks and preventing injury. 
 
Constant auditing and training of the workforce is required to ensure that the in-stope 
net is installed according to standard for it to be effective and that the nets are removed 
and stored in a safe place, to prevent damage, at the end of the shift.  
 
This addition and improvement to the support standard is not only effective from an 
arresting of falling rocks point of view, but it also improves the sense of safety felt by the 
workforce and all others entering the stope face as the implication is that for it to be 
properly installed, the support units, supporting the net, are properly installed. 
 
The addition of safety nets to the support standard comes at a cost; it requires 
additional work and time and the net itself comes at a cost, however, the added safety 
benefit outweigh this additional cost and enables the workforce to be “more at ease” 
when conducting their operational tasks and allows them to focus on the work at hand. 
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As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter that the second technique was to 
implement a system of in-stope bolting. In-stope bolting is a more permanent system of 
protection. Once the roof bolts are installed into the hanging wall, they cannot be 
removed, whereas, in the case of in-stope netting, the nets have to be removed before 
the blast and stored in a safe place to prevent damage. The risk of being injured, in the 
removal of the net process, does exist. The following chapter discusses in-stope bolting 
which was the last addition to the support standard at Thuthukani Shaft, KDC at this 
point in time. 
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Chapter 7 
7. IN-STOPE BOLTING AS TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT SUPPORT 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In-stope bolting is one of the many measures implemented at KDC aimed at eliminating 
falls of ground in the stope face area. In-stope bolting assists in this regard by 
increasing the stability of the immediate hanging wall beam thereby increasing its 
support resistance. It also provides face area support during all periods of the mining 
cycle, it is a permanent installation providing twenty- four hour support which is not 
removed and increases the area coverage of the support system used. 
 
  
             
 
Figure 7.1.1 Typical section of a stope panel. (Not to scale) 
(Source: Gold Fields, 2012) 
 
Figure 7.1.1 is an indication of a typical section of a stope panel indicating the bedding 
planes, jointing, stress fractures and low angle fractures. In-stope bolting tends to bind 
some of these fractures zones in the hanging wall, thus reinforcing the hanging wall 
beam.  
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7.2 How does rock bolting work? 
The following set of pictures demonstrates how rock bolting works and is similar to the 
demonstration that Tom Lang conducted in the Snowy Mountain Project (Hoek, 2004). 
 
   
Figure 7.2.1 Steel Box. 
(Source: Gold Fields, 2012) 
 
Figure 7.2.1 depicts a steel box that was created to demonstrate the effects of rock 
bolting. The box contains four solid steel side walls which were welded together with the 
top and bottom of the box left open. 
 
 
Figure 7.2.2 Broken Rock. 
(Source: Gold Fields, 2012) 
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Figure 7.2.2 depicts a bucket of broken rock that will represent the broken and fractured 
rock that we normally find in the hanging wall of underground workings. This is only a 
representation and the rocks found underground will be much larger. 
 
Figure 7.2.3 depicts a wooden board that was used to mark and install some bolts, nuts 
and washers at regular intervals. The board is placed into the bottom opening of the 
steel box and clamped to the sides of the steel box by use of G-clamps that are installed 
on the four sides of the steel box. 
 
   
Figure 7.2.3 Bolts and washers. 
(Source: Gold Fields, 2012) 
 
 Figure 7.2.4 depicts the broken rock, indicated in Figure 7.2.2, which is poured into the 
steel box and onto the wooden board. The rocks are spread evenly onto the wooden 
board and amongst the bolts that protrude out. 
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Figure 7.2.4 Broken rock between the bolts compressed. 
(Source: Gold Fields, 2012) 
 
 
Figure 7.2.5 Tightening the bolts. 
(Source: Gold Fields, 2012) 
 
Figure 7.2.5 depicts the steel box being filled with more rocks, which is compressed 
into the steel box and washers and nuts being fastened onto the bolts. 
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Figure 7.2.6 The bottom of the steel box showing the beam created. 
(Source: Gold Fields, 2012) 
 
Figure 7.2.6 depicts the steel box, being viewed from underneath, where the G-clamps 
and wooden board have been removed. The compressed rock and tensioned bolts form 
a beam of rock. 
 
 
Figure 7.2.7 A rock prop is placed on top of the beam created demonstrating the 
strength of the beam created. 
(Source: Gold Fields, 2012) 
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Figure7.2.7 depicts a rock prop, which is in excess of twenty kilograms in mass, placed 
on the beam that was created with the bucket of rocks and bolts. This is an indication of 
the strength of the beam formed. 
 
 
The figure below explains how rock bolts work. 
 
Figure 7.2.8 How rock bolts work. 
(Source: Gold Fields, 2012) 
 
 
A zone of compression is induced in the region shown in red. This zone will provide 
effective reinforcement to the rock mass. However, in the underground environment, it 
is not possible to install washers and nuts on both ends of the bolts as one has to drill 
into the hanging wall. Tensioning is achieved by either creating lateral forces from the 
bolt or by the use of a quick setting resin. This is one mechanism of stabilization by 
bolting; others include binding bottom roof layers onto upper ones and stabilizing jointed 
hanging wall by intersecting joint and fracture planes. 
 
7.3 Types of bolts that can be used with in-stope bolting 
 
 Henning and Ferreira, (2009) have done some research into “In-stope bolting for a 
safer working environment” which was presented to The South African Institute of 
Mining and Metallurgy Hard Rock Safe, Safety Conference in 2009. They described the 
types of bolts that can be used with in-stope bolting. Figure 7.3.1 indicates this 
representation. Table 7.3.1, from their presentation, indicates the different 
characteristics of these bolts. 
  
 
 
100 
 
 
  End Anchored Bolt           Full Column resin/grout Bolt        Split set/hydro inflated Bolt                 
 
Figure 7.3.1 Types of bolts that can be used with in-stope bolting. 
(Source: Henning and Ferreira, 2009) 
 
All of the bolts indicated in Figure 7.3.1 have been tested and used at KDC for various 
purposes non-systematically; however, with the introduction of in-stope bolting as a 
standard practice, the full column resin/grout bolt was the bolt of choice and detail 
regarding full column grout/ resin is discussed in the following section of this report. 
Standardizing of in-stope bolting material and procedures makes facilitation of training 
practices and auditing of workplaces more manageable.   
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Table 7.3.1 Characteristics of different types of bolts used with in-stope bolting. 
 
Characteristic 
End anchor/rock 
Stud 
Resin/full column 
grouted 
Hydro Bolt Split Set 
Equipment 
Requirements 
T-
spanner/Pneumatic 
torque wrench 
Spinning 
adaptor/grout 
pump 
25 Mpa 
pump, hoses 
and couplers 
Pusher dolly 
Installation 
Time 
60 seconds 60 seconds 60 seconds 
with pump in 
good working 
order 
60 seconds + 
Full Column 
Support 
No 100% Approx 85% Approx 85% 
Active 
Support 
Yes – if properly 
tensioned 
Active when 2 
speed resin 
system is used 
and tensioning is 
done before the 
setting time of 
5/10 resin 
Yes- if 
properly 
inflated 
Yes-provided 
that hole 
diameter is 
correct 
Typical Peak 
Load 
10.5 tons 15.5 – 17 tons 10.7 tons 5 tons- slip in 
excess 
Installed 
Reliability 
70% 90% 80% 85% 
depending 
on proper 
installation 
Sensitivity to 
undersized 
bore hole 
dia.(e.g. bit 
wear) 
Not generally 
sensitive 
Sensitive when 
oversized holes 
are drilled. 
Recommendation 
is to drill 
28millimeters 
holes with 
20millimeters 
resin bolt 
Decreased 
performance 
due to partial 
inflation 
Will increase. 
Difficult to 
install 
Underground 
Resilience 
Damaged plate, 
thread, if not 
properly tensioned 
Excellent  Good, valve 
damage 
unlikely  
Good 
Shear Yield 
Ability 
16-18millimeters Low 7millimeters 16-18 
millimeters 
16-
18millimeters 
End 
Anchoring 
and Critical 
Bond Length 
Anchor on shell 
only  
Good with 2 
speed resin and 
if tensioning of 
bolt is done 
Friction 
anchoring 
over length of 
bolt 
No end 
anchoring, 
friction only 
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Comments Expensive, 
ineffective in not 
tensioned properly  
Low cost, very 
strong and early 
strength when 
resin is used 
Very 
expensive- 
corrosion 
Corrosion- 
dependent 
on correctly 
drilled holes 
(Source: Henning and Ferreira, 2009) 
7.4 Resin Capsule and Rock Bolt Specifications 
 
Figure 7.4.1 Cross-section of a resin capsule. (Not to scale) 
(Source: Minova, 2011) 
 
Figure 7.4.1 represents the cross-section of a resin capsule. A resin capsule is a two-
compartment tube containing a polyester resin composition in one compartment and a 
catalyst composition in the other compartment. When the capsule is used the 
separation between the two compartments is broken and the two compositions are 
mixed together. The catalyst causes the resin to harden at a controlled and pre-selected 
speed. The hardened resin securely anchors the rock bolt into the hole, strengthening 
the rock. 
 
The skin of the capsule is special polyester which is strong enough to contain and 
protect the contents during manufacturing, storage and handling, yet breaks up easily in 
the rock bolt hole, to completely release the two compositions and not interfere with the 
contact between the set resin and the rock or the rock bolt. 
 
The hardened resin is a high-strength grout which completely fills the gap between the 
rock bolt and the rock, securely bonding the bolt into the hole. Figure 7.4.2 indicates 
how this occurs. 
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Figure 7.4.2 Resin between the rock and rock bolt. 
(Source: Minova, 2011) 
 
It is the rock bolt which strengthens the rock. The function of the resin is to transmit 
stresses between the rock and the rock bolt without allowing the rock bolt to move. The 
resin does this by filling all irregularities on the surface of the rock and the bolt. The two 
surfaces cannot slide past each other, nor can the rock close in towards the bolt. The 
rock is effectively locked into place by the resin and rock bolt combination. The resin is 
not glue, if the two surfaces are pulled away from each other, the resin will offer 
relatively little resistance. 
 
The full volume between the rock bolt and the rock is filled with resin; the bolt can but 
does not have to be tensioned. The advantages of using the resin capsule are that the 
resin is stiff and has a highly effective suspension and clamping effect and it retains this 
effectiveness. It does not require a competent anchoring layer and the bolt is protected 
from corrosion. 
 
Figure 7.4.3 Rock bolt, resin and surrounding rock mass. 
(Source: Minova, 2011) 
 
Rock bolt surface 
Rock surface 
Rock Bolt 
Resin 
Surrounding rock 
mass 
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Some of the precautions to be taken are that the correct size drill bit must be used when 
drilling the rock bolting holes and the correct length of hole must be drilled. Over sized 
holes will eliminate “full column” resin fill. Figure 7.4.4 below indicate the hole depth 
and diameter. 
 
Figure 7.4.4 Hole depth and diameter. 
(Source: Minova, 2011) 
 
Figure 7.4.5 below indicates some important specifications when installing roof bolts. 
 
 
Figure 7.4.5 Important specifications. 
(Source: Gold Fields, 2012) 
 
 
32millimeters x 
800millimeters x  
60 second Lokset 
“A” 
Resin Capsule  
Recommended 
In hole diameters 
from  
33millimeters to 
35millimeters 
 For 0.9m bolts 
Hole depth not  
to exceed 85cm  
 
1. Rockbolt must be drilled 
into the hanging wall at 70º 
to 90º 
 
2. Rockbolts must be 
20millimeters in diameter 
and 0,9m long  
 
3. Shear pin will fail at 80 
N/m force ensuring good 
anchoring is achieved during 
tensioning 
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7.5 Installation Procedure 
 
 
 
Figure 7.5.1 Resin and rock bolt installation procedure. 
(Source: Gold Fields, 2012) 
 
Figure 7.5.1 indicates the resin and rock bolt installation procedure that was introduced 
as part of the improvement made to the support standard at KDC in 2012.  The 
procedure makes reference to spinning which is a process that breaks the skin of the 
capsule, releasing the resin and catalyst, mixing them together. The catalyst causes the 
resin to start setting. If the bolt is not spun enough, the resin and catalyst will not mix 
properly and the resin will not set hard rendering the bolt ineffective. If spinning is 
excessive, the partially-set resin is broken up and too weak to be effective. It is 
therefore, critically, important for the procedure to be followed accurately for in-stope 
bolting to be effective. 
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 7.6 Conclusion 
 
In-stope bolting was the last amendment made to the support standard at Thuthukani 
shaft and this standard had to be fully implemented during the course of 2012. Initial 
installation involved the drilling of roof bolts with hand held machines towards the end of 
2011. This was received with resistance from the workforce as it implied additional 
work. However, the benefits outweigh this resistance as follows. 
 
In-stope bolting offers a twenty- four hour permanent support. This means that 
employees working on different shifts benefit from this installation. The installation also 
strengthens the immediate hanging wall beam, unlike temporary support where 
pressure is applied to the beam and then released when removing temporary support. 
This constant application and releasing of pressure onto the hanging wall has a 
negative effect with regards to falls of ground.  
 
Drilling and installation times have increased due to the added workload, however, 
cleaning times will be reduced due to less obstruction in the cleaning path in the form of 
temporary support legs and there will be less rock to handle from fall out.  Dilution is 
also reduced when fall out is reduced during and after blasting operations. 
 
Stope width control also improves when hanging wall conditions improve. In-stope 
bolting, which is a permanent installation, provides additional support in the back areas 
when sweepings are being conducted. 
 
Other means of in-stope bolting in the form of rock consolidation, with spiral bolts, 
abutment plates, wire mesh and resin injections, conducted by private contractors e.g. 
WIMICO, have been conducted in the past and will continue in the future in areas where 
ground conditions warrant it , for example,  in areas where the hanging wall lava is 
absolutely weak, WAF areas. This installation is an expensive procedure and is 
recommended by the responsible rock engineer after careful inspection of the affected 
workplaces and does not form part of the improvement of the general support standard 
for the mine. 
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Figure 7.6.1 Rock consolidation at Thuthukani Shaft, KDC. 
(Source: Personal Collection) 
 
Figure 7.6.1 shows two pictures indicating rock consolidation with abutment plates and 
wire mesh. The spiral bolt is used as a drill steel and is drilled into the hanging wall, the 
drill machine is removed and rock consolidation resin is pumped through the spiral bolt 
into the rock mass. This resin permeates into all the fractured zones, intersected by the 
spiral bolt, and consolidates the rock mass. Abutment plates with wire mesh are used to 
further reinforce the installation and rock consolidation.  
 
 
Figure 7.6.2 In-stope bolting at Thuthukani Shaft, KDC. 
(Source: Personal Collection) 
 
Figure 7.6.2 shows the drilling of in-stope bolting and the installed bolt. 
In-stope bolting was only introduced to the support standard in 2012 and the different 
methods and equipment will now be tested in an effort to make in-stope bolting effective 
and as user friendly as possible. 
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Chapter 8 
8. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 8.1 Summary and Conclusions 
 
The mining of IBOG has been in existence for the past decade at Thuthukani Shaft, 
KDC. There is a large amount of investigation, planning, preparation, effort, time and 
money that goes into the mining of these IBOG and some of the detail was described in 
chapter two of this research report. During the planning phase, a register (Appendix G 
– a page from the register drawn up for Thuthukani Shaft, KDC) is drawn up of all the 
IBOG present at the shaft. This register provides details which firstly indicate whether 
the IBOG targeted are profitable or not. This is achieved by feeding all the necessary 
data regarding the specific isolated block of ground into a computer generated model 
which then calculates, using the latest gold price, whether the isolated block of ground 
is profitable or not. The program can be manipulated by changing the parameters with 
regards to cost and future gold price received to determine whether a specific isolated 
block of ground may become profitable to mine in the future. Monte Carlo simulations 
are then conducted by using a range of values to determine whether an isolated block 
of ground has the potential to add value to the company. Appropriate planning for that 
specific block of ground can then be determined. 
 
A number of criteria related to survey, sampling, geology and rock engineering must be 
satisfied in order to ensure that the safety and financial risks are minimized or 
eliminated. This data is also fed into the model in the form of ratings. Safety is of utmost 
importance, and in some cases where the model has indicated an isolated block of 
ground being profitable to mine, poor rock engineering ratings have led to that block of 
ground being abandoned. 
 
The register created, will indicate whether an isolated block of ground is profitable to 
mine or not, it will also indicate whether the block of ground is safe enough to mine or 
not.  Non-profitable and/or unsafe blocks are abandoned. The register also indicates the 
sequence of extracting the isolated blocks of ground as determined by the rock 
engineering department. If this sequence is not adhered to, it could lead to further 
isolated blocks of ground being abandoned due to rock engineering safety factors being 
exceeded. 
 
Together with the register, a master plan is developed depicting the IBOG and some of 
the information contained in the register. This plan is used by the production personnel 
to plan for Opening-up and rehabilitation of access ways to the IBOG. 
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Chapter three described and discussed the analysis conducted on seismic data, injury 
data, damage data and some production data captured from 2005 up to 2011. The 
injury and damage data analysis indicated a general decrease in injury and damage 
over the period investigated. Most of the data presented in this report indicate a marked 
improvement from 2008. This correlates to the improvements made to the support 
systems over time with the increase in support density up to 2008, the introduction of 
pre-conditioning as a standard in 2009, the introduction of in-stope netting in 2011 and 
finally, the implementation of in-stope bolting in 2012 which, in the authors opinion, will 
have a major positive effect with regards to preventing fall of ground accidents in the 
underground workings of Thuthukani Shaft, KDC. 
 
Chapter five, six and seven describe some of the detail with regards to pre-conditioning, 
in-stope netting and in-stope bolting. A description of how they function and how they 
add value with regards to creating a safer mining environment is specified. It is 
interesting to note that pre-conditioning, in-stope netting and in-stope bolting have been 
in existence for many years and have been used on different mines and at specific work 
places where the individuals that required them motivated and justified their use. It is 
only in the recent past, that there is a focus and commitment towards drastically 
improving the safety in South African mines and a major drive to prevent fall of ground 
accidents that have created a need for the above mentioned to be explored and 
implemented systematically and systemically. 
 
Analysis of seismic data from 2005 to 2011 have indicated that the support systems at 
Thuthukani Shaft, KDC , when mining isolated blocks of ground, have been 
continuously improving  to such an extent that seismic events in excess of magnitude 1 
have resulted in workplaces experiencing little or no damage. The 2011 statistics in 
Figure 4.7 indicate that 95% of the total number of seismic events, with magnitude 
greater than 1, resulted in no damage to workings; however, there are still 5% of 
seismic events, with magnitude greater than 1, which did cause damage to workings.  
With the recent introduction of in-stope bolting to the support standard in 2012, it is 
expected that workplaces will be even more robust with regards to withstanding large 
magnitude seismic events. 
 
Bearing this in mind, it can be noted that the mining of IBOG can be executed safely 
and economically. Most of the IBOG that were investigated at Thuthukani Shaft, KDC 
were found to be in a position to be mined safely and economically, but there were a 
few that were found to be unsafe or not economically viable, for example, in APPENDIX 
G, the block is shown to produce a profit margin of sixty four percent, however the risk 
relating to rock engineering criteria were found to be high and the recommendation was 
that this block could not be mined. The mining of IBOG require proper investigations, 
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planning, sequence of extraction, and effort. It is an academic process that requires 
time and patience. There are no quick- wins or short-cuts.  Support systems will have to 
be developed using industry best practices, implemented and strictly adhered to in order 
to achieve success. This does not mean that there will be a decrease in seismic activity 
or that seismic activity will be eliminated (Vieira et al), it means that seismic activity can 
be managed better and that the support system used will have the capacity to withstand 
fairly large seismic events, preventing injury to the workforce and damage to the 
workings. 
 
8.2 Recommendation for Future Work 
 
The author was unable to retrieve detailed production data which would have been work 
place specific. This information would have assisted in determining whether increasing 
production led to certain workplaces experiencing more seismic activity, whether 
improving the support standard led to a decrease in production output, and whether 
over supporting of workplaces led to no damage caused by large magnitude seismic 
events where production outputs were poor. The crew size linked to specific crew 
performances would also indicate what the effect of the improving support standard on 
production output, as observed over time would be. It is recommended that this data be 
captured and stored for future research work. 
 
Analysis of the production data that was retrievable for the entire section indicated a 
direct relationship between production and seismic activity. Periods of high production 
indicated a larger number of seismic events in excess of magnitude 1, as described in 
chapter 3 of this research report. 
 
It was noted that data capturing and record keeping had improved in the latter years of 
the research period. The author was unable to retrieve consistent records of the 
conditions of the support in relation to the standard after a major seismic event and it is 
recommended that proper investigations be conducted after major seismic events, 
whether damage is caused or not, in order to note whether deviations from mining 
standards are present or not and to note what had been done correctly in cases where 
no damage had been experienced. In many cases where no injury and/or damage are 
caused by a seismic event, the investigation is limited, or not conducted at all. 
 
The introduction of in-stope bolting at Thuthukani Shaft, KDC as a mine standard was 
initiated in 2012. Data relating to the effects of in-stope bolting with regards to damage 
caused by seismic activity or the absence thereof is required for future analysis. This 
information will assist in determining if the addition of in-stope bolting to the support 
standard at Thuthukani Shaft, KDC is capable of reducing the damaged caused by the 
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5% of seismic events in excess of magnitude 1 that did cause damage to workings in 
2011, further. 
 
From the analysis of data and support improvements researched over a period from 
2005 to 2011, the following high level process should be followed when attempting to 
mine IBOG and establishing a support system for this purpose: 
 
1. Establish a company statement that will cause people within the company to act 
with energy, focus and enthusiasm. It was noted in this study that a major turning 
point was established when the Chief Executive Officer of Gold Fields Limited, 
Nick Holland, stated publicly, “If we cannot mine safely, we won’t mine at all”. 
This caused all persons within the company to really focus on safety and creating 
safe working environments. Production delivery targets dropped as shaft repair 
programs took precedence and ultimately a distinct change could be noted in the 
data presented in this report with regards to support improvements relating to 
seismic events in excess of magnitude 1, after this statement was made. 
2. A thorough investigation of the targeted block and its surrounding area is 
required. This includes historical data relating to mine design, geology, rock 
engineering and sampling data that was captured regarding the area, and site 
inspections in the form of  reconnaissance visits  must be conducted in order to 
assess rehabilitation requirements and obtain samples to confirm historical data. 
3. An analysis of historical data concerning the area targeted must be conducted to 
establish trends and behavior of the ore body and targeted block of ground. 
4. Opening-up, rehabilitation and development plans must be established together 
with a schedule for execution. 
5. A mine design plan, which will include a sequence of extraction of the ore body, 
from the rock engineering department must be developed and verified, 
preferably, by an external consultant. 
6. A support system which must consider the unique properties and characteristics 
of the targeted block of ground as well as industry best practice must be 
designed with the intention for this support system to withstand large magnitude 
seismic events which seem to be more prominent when mining IBOG. 
7. A system to capture and store data relating to the changes and improvements 
made to the support system over time must be developed so that proper analysis 
can be conducted in the future to determine the impact of changes made to the 
support system and future requirements. 
 
As more deep level gold mines start to explore the IBOG that remain on their shafts with 
the intention of extracting them  in order to prolong the life of their shafts, it is important 
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that the high level points, above, be considered to ensure that safety and production 
targets are met. 
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